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The number of devices connected to the Internet is growing exponentially. These devices
include smartphones, tablets, workstations and Internet of Things devices, which offer a
number of cost and time savings by automating routine tasks for the users. However, these
devices also introduce a number of security and privacy concerns for the users. These devices
are connected to small office/home-office (SOHO) and enterprise networks, where users have
very little to no information about threats associated to these devices and how these devices
can be managed properly to ensure user’s privacy and data security. We proposed a new
platform to automate the security and management of the networks providing connectivity to
billions of connected devices. Our platform is low cost, scalable and easy to deploy system,
which provides network security and management features as a service. It is consisted of two
main components i.e. Securebox and Security and Management Service (SMS). Securebox
is a newly designed Openflow enabled gateway residing in edge networks and is responsible
for enforcing the security and management decisions provided by SMS. SMS runs a number
of traffic analysis services to analyze user traffic on demand for Botnet, Spamnet, malware
detection. SMS also supports to deploy on demand software based middleboxes for on demand
analysis of user traffic in isolated environment. It handles the configuration update, load
balancing and scalability of these middlebox deployments as well. In contrast to current state
of the art, the proposed platform oﬄoads the security and management tasks to an external
entity, providing a number of advantages in terms of deployment, management, configuration
updates and device security. We have tested this platform in real world scenarios. Evaluation
results show that the platform can be efficiently deployed in traditional networks in an
incremental manner. It also allows us to achieve similar user experience with security features
embedded in the connectivity.
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1 Introduction
In recent times, the devices connected to our networks have become smarter
but the underlying networks are using decades old approach for security and
management to billions of these devices. Networking gear manufacturers and
network managers have come up with solutions to deal with issues faced in
network management, however, there is a need of improvement in network
deployment architecture and technologies to deal with the existing challenges
in terms of securely managing connected devices.
Recent advancements in technology have been the driving factor in the
development of the new generation of smart portable devices including smart
phones, smart watches, and tablet PCs to give some examples. Together
they add up to more than 6.4 billion connected devices and this number is
growing at a fast pace [107].
1.1 Internet of Things
Internet of Things (IoT) has recently gained huge popularity among con-
sumers and estimates predict that there will be more than 20 billion connected
devices by 2020 [106]. These devices promise to bring a number of time
saving and comforting features to smart homes e.g. remotely opening door
lock, checking ingredients from fridge etc. [21] IoT devices also promise to
improve the industrial process automation, manufacturing and storage. Re-
mote deployments of IoTs can be very useful in various sensing applications
in marine, meteorology, seismic sciences etc. Various reports have estimated
that IoT will add upto $10 − $15 trillion in the next decade with upto $6
trillion dollar spent in IoT infrastructure deployments in the next 5 years [68].
Figure 1 shows a typical smart home environment with a number of IoT
connected devices. These devices collect the data from smart home and
send this data to cloud-based applications, which provide different services
to the users. These devices can be controlled using companion smartphone
applications. The companion applications also allow users to access different
functionalities offered by the web service collecting data from the IoT devices.
Health monitoring and wearables are very common examples of IoT where
the devices constantly collects the data about user’s health e.g., heart rate,
workouts, calories etc. This data can be accessed via smartphone applications
and some web services provide suggestions to the user about improving their
health, diet and workout plans [121]. New generation of wearables include
connected clothes, connected shoes etc.
IoT devices typically consist of one or more sensors. These devices are
designed to perform specific functions e.g., monitoring (preferably) using
very few resources e.g., an IoT sensor running on battery power is expected
to run for months before the battery dies. Due to the lack of resources, IoT
devices typically run a very stripped down version of an operating system
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Figure 1: Smart homes. A typical smart home environment has a number
of connected devices collecting and sending user data to associated cloud
based services. Users can control these devices via companion smart phone
or web applications and data is used to provide suggestive services for users
as well as improve device performance and automation.
and in many cases they do not have an operating system at all. Due to
limited hardware and energy sources, there is no “Graphical User Interface”
(GUI) and very few other interfaces to communicate with the IoT device [6].
The function of IoT devices is mainly to collect data about their users and
surroundings. IoT devices then send this data to services usually deployed
in cloud environments, which in turn provide different kind of functionalities
e.g., health monitoring, object tracking etc. [121, 130] These devices connect
to these cloud-based services either directly or via an IoT hub. Since these
devices do not have any resources to process or store this data locally, every
IoT device requires constant connectivity for relaying the collected data to
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users or cloud based services.
IoT devices are generally developed by fast moving teams in large enter-
prises or independently working startup teams with limited resources. The
development cycle for these devices is very tight with strict deadlines and
the teams face a constant pressure of launching their products in the market
as soon as possible (before any other manufacturer launches similar device)
to get maximum customer base. Due to these constraints, there is little to
no effort put into inherently securing device design and implementation of
IoT devices [106].
Once the device is launched, there are no firmware updates or security
patches made available for these devices. The diversity of manufacturers
manufacturing IoT devices has made it harder to standardize the communica-
tion and development procedures for these devices. Lack of standardization
further complicates development and support cycle. Since, IoT devices have
a number of sensors constantly monitoring and collecting user related infor-
mation, lack of secure design raises a number of security concerns for these
devices [132, 131].
1.2 Cybersecurity and IoT
With the increasing number of connected devices, cyber security has become
more important than ever. Large enterprises, governments and other institu-
tions are spending more money in cyber security infrastructure than ever
before. Studies have shown that the spending in cyber security has increased
from $3.5 billion (2005) to $75 billion (2015) and is expected to increase
upto $170 billion by 2020. Careful predictions estimate upto $1 trillion spent
in cyber security in 2017-2021 period [68].
Every year cyber security causes $350-500 billion losses out of which
$150−160 billion losses are suffered by individuals through credit card scams
etc. [63] United States (US) and European union (EU) are frequent targets
of these cyber crimes, which can cost more than 150000 jobs every year in
each of these regions. With the growing popularity of IoT devices, cyber
security has become a bigger problem than before and reports estimate the
size of cyber security market will grow upto $2 trillion dollars [67].
Security and privacy are important concerns for online users. With the
recent popularity of e-commerce, cloud storage and cloud based services,
network security and user privacy have become even more important. IoT
and BYOD related security threats are fairly new to existing network se-
curity techniques and tools, which are mostly designed for large enterprise
networks [80]. Therefore, we need to develop new techniques for securing
these networks connecting large numbers of heterogeneous devices.
The cost of deploying and operating network security solutions, e.g.,
Firewall (FW), Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) is high. Therefore, these
solutions are mainly adopted by large enterprises with sufficient resources to
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deploy and maintain them. Small enterprise and home users also need similar
facilities, but do not have the resources. Our work in this article introduces
the advantages of these sophisticated security and remote management
solutions to all users with low cost.
1.2.1 Data handling
With all the possibilities and promises for smart future using IoT devices,
there are some huge problems in terms of security. The biggest threats comes
from the way IoT devices collect and manage user related data i.e. what
kind of information is collected? How frequently is it collected? How is it
stored? How and where is it processed? and a number of other questions.
In normal practise, the best approach is to send only minimal data to web
services [103, 108]. However, due to limited hardware, power resources and
inefficient system design, most IoT devices upload all information collected
from the users for “just in case” and “future use” purposes. Encryption is
one of the possible solutions to protect user data. However, due to lack of
power and hardware resources, nearly 70% of IoT devices do not encrypt
their communications [105].
These approaches seriously affect the security and privacy of user’s
personal information. Typically, IoT devices are saved from many network
attacks due to the presence of “Network Address Translation” (NAT) existing
between user’s internal network and the Internet. Also, there is little incentive
in hacking IoT devices if they are few in number. However, both these
incentives will soon be gone with deployment of IPv6 across networks and
ever increasing number of IoT devices in home and enterprises.
Smart phones and tablets also suffer from the same problem. These
devices have a number of sensors and the applications can collect various
kinds of information about the users to improve their services. If these
services are breached, user’s secret information including their identification
and credit card information is accessible by rogue entities, causing serious
security risks for the users.
Another important issue with IoT devices is the control system design.
All data from IoT devices is either uploaded directly to cloud services or
oﬄoaded to IoT hub (via low power communication protocol) which then
sends this data to the cloud services. In order for an attacker to get this data,
he only needs to steal user’s login credentials for cloud service or access to
communication between IoT hub and the device. Snooping on device to hub
communication is also an easy way to access user data because IoT devices
do not encrypt these communications in most of the cases.
Stealing user credentials is also not very difficult for a moderately skilled
attacker due to a number of loopholes in communication protocols being
used [94, 33]. It is also known that average users do not make a serious effort
for selecting a strong password and keeping it safe [66]. 80% of IoT devices
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do not force users to chose sufficiently strong and complex passwords [105].
With IoT devices, these passwords are going to become the key to user’s
home, bank accounts, health records etc. making the security issues with
IoT security situation more complex and important.
1.2.2 Cybersecurity in SOHO networks
Small office and home office (SOHO) networks are a center piece to network
security puzzle. These networks have a large number of connected devices.
Gartner expects a typical home to have 500 connected devices by 2022 [35].
Home networks are typically the most insecure network deployments with
no serious security mechanism to protect the connected devices. Most of the
devices in home contain personal information about the user. Due to lack
of security, these devices can easily be hijacked to compromise user privacy.
With growing number of IoT devices, an attacker can cause a number of
problems for a normal user, just by remotely controlling these devices e.g.,
playing inappropriate content on your smart TV or playing loud music at
night to your connected speakers.
There are different kind of attacks happening on IoT devices and smart
homes. Attackers mainly target home routers, setup boxes and IoT devices
using factory default settings and security credentials. These devices can be
used as agents for botnets, spam-nets, distributed denial of services (DDoS)
attacks, Bitcoin mining etc. The compromised nodes can also be sold to
adversary individual or agencies which can use them to spy on user activities
or launch large scale ransom-ware, botnet and similar attacks [40, 50]. Some
researchers have been able to trick IoT devices to spill out Wi-Fi passphrase
of user network, giving them unwarranted access to all devices connected in
the user network.
Wi-Fi based attacks are very crucial as these attacks does not require an
attacker to physically trespass user premises to gain access to user devices.
Recent research has shown that over 62.6% of home broadband networks
use wireless connectivity for network setup [68] and this share is increasing.
In typical cases, it is not difficult for an attacker to get the snoop Wi-Fi
password [81, 119, 116]. Once attacker gets this password, it can connect to
network and seamlessly communicate with other devices, possibly hacking
or infecting them. There is no option to secure device to device (D2D)
communications in Wi-Fi networks using typical gateways deployed in SOHO
and IoT networks.
The purpose and methods of hacking are constantly evolving. Modern
day hackers can use compromised IoT devices e.g., temperature, light sensors,
electric meters etc. to find out whether a person is inside home or not. They
can also hijack smart locks to ease break-ins without raising any alarms.
Hackers can sell this information to burglars and help them carry out criminal
activities more securely. Several news article have shown how burglars and
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thief are using technology to conduct their activities easily without alarming
people around [126, 2].
Modern smart phones and IoT devices are equipped with a number of
sensors and many of them are always-on. Therefore, an attacker can effectively
use compromised devices to actively spy on user activities, movements [61, 1].
New generation of smart TV and virtual assistants e.g., Amazon Echo [28],
Google Nest [124] etc. come with microphone and video cameras installed.
An attacker can hijack these devices, using compromised user credentials or
“man-in-the-middle” (MITM) etc. to get access to live audio and video feed
from inside user home, which is a serious threat to user privacy [62].
1.2.3 Cybersecurity in enterprise networks
Enterprises are also expected to have large IoT installations for manufacturing,
supply, storage units etc. IoT devices are used to improve automation in
product development cycle. IoT sensors can be deployed across enterprises,
sub offices and products to monitor the product functionality and detect any
issues or faults. These IoT devices make it difficult for network management
team to perfectly secure enterprise networks because on one hand they
require connectivity to enterprise services but on the other hand, they can
be physically accessed and used to breach in enterprise network.
A large installation of heterogeneous IoT devices from multiple vendors
also makes it difficult to develop a uniform strategy for securing all these
devices. Additionally, IoT devices do not provide inherent security neither
do they allow users to install custom security applications e.g., anti-virus
etc. There is insufficient authentication and authorization mechanism and
insecure protocols are used for communication, making these devices easier
to hack.
Enterprises are also joining “Bring Your Own Device” (BYOD) band-
wagon, which allows employees to connect their insecure devices to enterprise
network and use enterprise services to increase employee productivity. Previ-
ously, enterprise networks had tighter restrictions over what devices could
be connected and it was easier to manage network but BYOD has made this
task much complex. There are a number of heterogeneous devices used by
employees and most of them are not secure because there can be malicious
applications, malwares, trojans installed on these devices without user’s
knowledge.
Enterprise network managers and Chief Information Security Officers
(CISOs) have been concerned over the way IoT and BYOD has changed the
network security situation in enterprise and corporate networks. Majority of
CISOs agree that IoT has made network management tasks more complex
than it was before [80]. When a large number of unknown (employee’s
personal) mobile and IoT devices will be connected to enterprise networks,
IoT cloud services will be collecting and processing a large amount of business
6
critical data as well, which can lead to business losses for the enterprise.
1.3 Cyber security attacks in the wild
There have been various kinds of attacks happening affecting millions of
connected users.
Hijacking home routers: Network attacks are a common place these
days and their frequency is growing rapidly day by day [24]. Typically,
attackers hijack home routers around the world and change their DNS
servers to communicate with attacker controlled servers. Attackers can then
redirect user traffic to malicious web pages for carrying out phishing, click
fraud etc. attacks. Attackers can also use such hijacked networks and devices
to use them for DDoS or botnets attacks. They can serve malicious web
pages hosting malicious content in response of a legitimate request. This
also leads to ransom-ware attacks which are very common these days.
It is common for attackers to login to home routers using manufacturer’s
default login credentials (e.g., username=“admin”, password=“admin”) as
most of the users do not change login credentials after buying home gateways,
routers or access points. Attackers can also use cross-site request forgery to
gain access to local router’s management interface, even it it is not exposed
to the Internet.
Hijacking setup boxes and NAS: Attacker have also targeted many
device with embedded Linux such as DVR and NAS devices. These devices
are mainly hacked for mining bitcoin and crypto-currency. Most of the
attacks are launched as worms, where one infected device joins the network
and infects other devices connected to the same network. With growing
deployment of Wi-Fi networks, worms pose a serious threat to the devices.
Webcam and CCTV hijacking: Webcam hijacking of laptops and
other machines connected to home networks have become increasingly fre-
quent these days. These hijacked webcams are used to record private videos
of users which are later used for making ransom demands etc [78, 120].
Hijacking CCTVs also pose threat to home and enterprise security as a
burglars can hack these cameras to assist them during burglaries. In later
2014, somebody setup a website showing live video stream from 4600 cameras
around the world. The attacker scanned through Internet for connected
cameras and used factory default username and password to get access to
the live feed [59].
There are hundreds of thousands of cases where connected devices were
hijacked by attacker or security researchers to show the extent of vulnerability
and security risks associated to these devices [119, 81].
Network security is a big problem especially in SOHO networks because
average users do not have the expertise nor the resource to manage the
security of their networks. Typical network security equipment is expensive
enough for a home or small business owner to use it for their network security.
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Additionally, lack of awareness also leads to bad security practises for these
users. As long as they are not first hand victim of hacking or ransom-ware
etc., they do not consider the impact of these attacks. With so many IoT
devices attached to user networks, these users (unknowingly) become part
of online cyber crime as sophisticated hackers first hijack devices in Small
and Home Office (SOHO) networks and use them to launch DDoS attacks
against enterprise networks.
Recent research has shown that SOHO users are motivated for securing
their networks and devices but it is too difficult for them to securely configure
these devices due to the low level knobs available at typical (low-cost) network
gateways [18]. Therefore, there is a constant demand for a solution which
is easy to manage and operate for average users. One possible approach to
secure these networks is to hire permanent experts or managers to securely
operate the networks, but this is not feasible due to high costs of these
experts.
A substitute approach requisites one expert managing more than one
networks but neither is this approach scalable nor affordable. Additionally,
this approach can bring a lot of inconsistencies in network configurations
as each network can have a different set of requirements. Other approaches
to make networks “easier to manage” still assumes that network will be
managed by some dedicated managers or operators and SOHO networks still
lack these dedicated managers.
1.4 Improving cybersecurity
One approach to deal with these issues is to release the burden of security
and management of SOHO networks from their users by oﬄoading the
security mechanism to a third party service provider. Nick Feamster initially
suggested this idea of a third party managing network security issues [31].
Such a system will allows users to operate their networks in “plug and forget”
manner where they do not need to care about security and configuration
updates for their network. For such a system, every network needs to have a
programmable gateway which can constantly monitor the network and act
accordingly. This gateway also collects network level statistics and user data
to secure the traffic by filtering malicious flows in the network.
However, this approach will bring a number of new challenges [31]. Firstly,
the programmable gateway should be smart enough to swiftly detect and
block any malicious traffic flows in the network, requiring a robust mechanism
for detection of such flows. The scale of data collected from these networks
will be huge, containing lots of repetition and noise. The system should
be efficient enough to filter out any data which negatively effects system
analysis outcome. It needs smart algorithm and techniques to develop such
systems. If the data is processing remotely, the system should be sensitive
enough to immediately detect any anomaly and direct network devices to
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filter out the threat immediately. A lot of traffic we see is overlapping (due
to flash crowds, viral content etc.), and analyzing this overlapping traffic
from different source is a waste of resources.
Secondly, this approach raises a set of privacy challenges due to distributed
data collection from SOHO networks, containing sensitive information e.g.,
user browsing history, login information etc. This information can be used to
track user’s online activities which raises some concerns for privacy advocates.
Thirdly, the system should be able to heal itself i.e. a remote management
service managing devices in SOHO networks should be able to correct the
failures and misconfiguration it did previously. This feature would require a
robust feedback loop in configuration update engine to learn and improve
itself.
In this work, we look into the requirements from such a system which
can provide network management and security as a service to SOHO and
enterprise networks. We explored the challenges of building and deploying
such a system in real world environment. We have also looked into various
architectures for deploying such a system. Based on the literature survey and
results of previous testing, we designed a system that is capable of oﬄoading
security and management tasks to a third party service provider. The service
will work in a plug and forget manner where the network devices are managed
via remote service without requiring significant user interaction required.
Our system offers a set of security and devices management services.
It provides complete control to the users for managing the services used
to manage and secure their networks. The users are able to classify their
devices and individually decide what kind of services should be performed
for each of these devices. The remote service will provide a set of services
including network device management, user device management, user and
device profiles, remote traffic analysis, scalable software defined middlebox
deployments etc. We have also designed a smart gateway for networks which
allows us to monitor and secure edge networks. This gateway also acts as
a sensor which collects network meta-data and use it to improve overall
network security across all connected networks.
1.5 Network Management
IoT, smart devices, personal computing devices need connectivity for their
operations. An average user needs Internet access on all its devices for
various reasons. Billions of these devices have already been connected to the
networks which use the same technology and protocols from decades ago.
However, looking forward to connect the next 30-40 billions devices to the
same network definitely raises some concerns on how these networks will
provide connectivity to all these devices and how will they coup with the
management overhead.
New generation of networking gear comes with a number of features for
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IoT connectivity and network management but they pace of improvement in
network industry is slower than IoT and smart devices. Therefore, future
networks deployment needs to be improved to provide efficient connectivity
to these tens of billions of devices. As most of the devices use wireless
connectivity, which already have a number of security issues, we need to the
improve these networks to provide easily manageable inherent security to all
connected devices as well [51].
1.5.1 SOHO networks
Networks in SOHO environments are poorly managed. These networks are
setup using low cost routers or access points (AP) providing basic connectivity
to all devices. The networking gear used in these networks do not offer enough
control to the users over the device and network management. They provide
basic security features e.g., MAC address filtering etc. The users of these
networks mostly lack the expertise to use these low level knobs to perform
any operation.
Since, SOHO networks connect the majority of users who suffer most
individual losses in cyber crimes, they need to be well managed and well
secured. These networks are expected to connect more than 50% of next 20
billion devices connected to the Internet. The users in this network also want
a system that is easily manageable and is low cost to deploy and operate.
Typically, these users rely on the gateways provided by Internet Service
Providers (ISP) to handle all the underlying functions and provide device
connectivity. However, in order to easily manage and secure the users and
devices connected to these networks, networking gear should support easy
management by providing high level network information and function control
knobs to the users.
1.5.2 Enterprise networks
Enterprises have large network deployments with a team of experts managing
all these networks. With the popularity of IoT devices, the management
of these networks has become troublesome [80]. Network managers express
that the job of network management has become tougher then ever before
because of the huge number of heterogeneous devices connected to enterprise
networks. Also, the cost of deploying and managing enterprise setup is huge.
Therefore, networks deployments should be improved to mitigate these cost
and management issues.
1.6 Overview
In this report, we go through the state of the art from academic research
to deal with these security and management issues in networks. Sect. 2
also discusses the latest products from industry to improve home gateways.
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Sect. 3, 4 contains the details about design and architecture of Securebox and
SMS respectively. We have developed a prototype for our system to evaluate
its performance in real-world scenarios. Sect. 5 discusses this performance
evaluation in detail for a number of factors. Sect. 6 present a number of use
cases for our proposed system and explains how it can be advantageous to use
this platform for future network deployments in different environments. We
make a conclusive statement about this work Sect. 7. Sect. 7 also highlights
some limitations in this work and gives a heading to lead any future works.
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2 State of the Art
Improving network security has always been an active field in academic
research. There have been a number of security protocols (i.e. supporting en-
cryption etc.) proposed to achieve secure network communications. Software
defined Networking (SDN) research has become popular in the last decade,
opening new horizons for networking applications.
Researchers have also proposed several solutions for virutalizing middle-
box functionality using software defined middleboxes for security and traffic
analysis operations. These middleboxes can be deployed remotely and SDN
is used to dynamically re-route traffic through them. We discuss all these
research ideas and their applications in the following sections.
2.1 Software-defined Networking
Software-defined Networking (SDN) was initially proposed by Casado et al.
in 2007 [16]. Their work was motivated by the complexities and difficulties
faced in managing traditional computer networks. The closed nature of the
traditional networks equipment makes the process of updating configura-
tions slow, complex and expensive in terms of deployment and operational
costs [32].
Casado et.al envisioned programmable switches and routers where routing
and switching mechanism will become two separate planes i.e. “control plane”
and “data plane”. Control plane is responsible for deciding how to handle
the network traffic and Data plane is responsible for forwarding the traffic
according to the routing/switching decisions made by control plane. SDN
architecture consists of a controller (managing control plane operations)
managing one or more switches (managing data plane operations).
Due to its flexible and programmable architecture, SDN has gained
popularity in recent times. Many vendors have started supporting OpenFlow
APIs in their network equipments. A number of controllers have been
developed by both research community and industrial suppliers [29, 74, 42,
58, 114].
SDN promises to change the way traditional networks are managed
by offering a flexible model that supports dynamic reconfiguration of net-
work [16, 32]. Traditionally, SDN has been used in data center environments
for traffic management in wide area networks (WANs) and virtualization
platforms [55, 113]. However, programmers and researchers have used these
controllers to develop different kind of network applications e.g. dynamic
quality of service (QoS), access control [16, 71], load balancing [49, 118],
security [83] etc. We believe that SDN can provide better security and
remote management capabilities to SOHO networks. Previous research has
also showcased some techniques for using SDN for dynamic re-routing of
traffic through middleboxes deployed outside the network [37, 88, 99].
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SDN has promised to revolutionize networking as we knew it and it
has been successful in doing that by enabling interesting applications for
network devices. However, there are some limitations to SDN design as well.
SDN centralizes the control point of the network, which raises concerns of
performance bottlenecks and attacks against SDN itself. Various studies
have been performed on the resilience of this architecture against attacks
and performance losses [12, 75, 77].
In this work, we intend to design a smart programmable gateway for
networks. This gateway should be capable of monitoring the network and
filtering out malicious traffic dynamically. SDN is a useful candidate to built
such a gateway since it allows easy programmable interfaces to control the
routing and switching in the network. The use of SDN does incur a perfor-
mance penalty to the system, however, the advantages of the programmable
interfaces are vastly beneficial.
Sect. 3.1 explains our gateway design, which uses SDN to dynamically
filter and steer traffic in user network. (To the best of our knowledge) Our
system is the first attempt to realize the utilization of SDN in SOHO net-
works. Previously, there have been several design proposals and prototypes
to advocate the use of SDN in home networks [31] but we have realized a
system, which uses service based model and SDN for automation of net-
work security dynamics in a network. SDN provides a number of features
including flexibility in programming the network inclemently and revoke any
misconfiguration in the setup.
2.2 Related Work
Previously network security systems were designed for large enterprise and
corporate networks as those customers have enough resources to invest in net-
work security infrastructure and employ a team of professionals for managing
their systems. With growth in network coverage areas and advancements
in communication technologies e.g. 3G, 4G, LTE etc., more people are con-
nected to Internet in the last decade compared to the total period before that.
A vast majority of these connected devices are connected to the Internet via
SOHO networks. The fact that these numbers will increase exponentially
with the growing popularity of IoT devices, put SOHO networks in the center
of the whole network security picture.
2.2.1 Home Network Security
As discussed before, SOHO networks are insecure and poorly managed.
Similarly, IoT and BYOD trends are also compromising the security of
enterprise networks as well. Therefore, recent research has been focused on
how to secure these network with billions of connected devices. Nick Feamster
initially highlighted the problem of smart home security and proposed that
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a system that outsources home network security to an outside entity [31].
Yiakoumis et al. also looked into the problem of security in home networks
and their inflexibility for management [125]. They proposed a scheme to
slice home network to deal with the common issues. Their scheme provides
bandwidth and traffic isolation control, individual management, and ability
to improve or modify the behavior of each slice.
Kim et al. proposed Lithium which provides event driven control for
the home networks [57]. Lithium implements network policies based on four
domains: time, user, history and traffic flow. It allows operators to define
high level policies for the network and then translates these policies to low
level configuration changes to achieve desired functionality in the network.
Xu et al. have developed a system to capture and analyze home net-
work traffic [123]. They have captured real-world traffic traces from home
networks, characterize it and apply “principal component analysis” (PCA)
to understand temporal correlation between application ports. Using this
system, they were able to identify the sources of unwanted traffic in typical
home networks. This solution needs alot of training data and does not
prevent from snooping or phishing attacks.
Tialong et al. have identified the key challenges in network security due
to growing number of connected (IoT) devices [128]. They have argued that
these networks need to be secured to ensure user data privacy and security.
They have developed a system which monitors the home networks to identify
any vulnerabilities. It sends this information to an IoT security service which
directs the network device to take necessary actions to secure the network.
Zachariah et al. identified common issues with existing IoT gateway and
advocate that these issues hinder efficient IoT deployed [129]. Therefore, they
have proposed a system that can leverage Bluetooth (BLE) [47] connectivity
to connect IoT device to the Internet. They use smart phones as a gateway
for IoT devices to provide universal access to the Internet for BLE enabled
devices. These smartphone act as BLE proxy for IoT devices.
However, one possible issue with this architecture is that it cannot provide
all-the-time connectivity to the devices which are permanently installed e.g.
temperature sensors etc. Secondly, it requires explicit permissions from
smartphone owners to allow IoT devices to piggyback their networks, which
may end up consuming reasonable amount of user data packages. Also, IoT
devices may need to actively look for smartphones which may allow them
IoT devices to use them as proxy to connect to Internet. With limited power
resources, this active probing will result in battery drains. Additionally, IoT
devices may need to upload sensitive information but a malicious user himself
or a rogue application on the smart phone may steal this data, leading to
privacy concerns. Sect. 6.8 presents an improved system architecture which
can resolve a number of these issues.
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2.2.2 Home Network Management
A majority of users in SOHO as well as enterprise networks do not have
enough expertise and knowledge to manage their networks. They directly
plug their device to the access point and do not put special efforts in security
and optimization of their network. In order to improve and automate the
management of these networks, there has been some research in recent decade.
Gharakheili et al. have proposed the use of cloud-based SDN deployment
for managing home networks [38]. They have developed an architecture
which allows remote SDN controller to manage and prioritize devices in user
network. System prototype evaluation has shown that this architecture can
improve user experience. However, the efficiency of this solution is greatly
limited by the load on cloud-based SDN controller. Since, all the clients
have to go through remote SDN portal which would affect user experience.
Also, caching can be helpful in this work as it allows minimize latency for
two similar requests.
Chetty et al. have developed a system which allows user to monitor
traffic usage of their individual devices [18]. Their system uses an intelligent
gateway which requires monitors the data usage on device level granularity.
This system is useful for customer who have strict data usage limits on their
internet packages. It also allows them to detect any malicious activities
originating from devices, by observing the anomalies in device’s data usage.
Bozkurt and Benson have developed a contextual router for home net-
works which improves the traffic prioritization in home networks [9]. This
work includes the design goals for a management framework which optimizes
network utility in networks with multiple network devices. This optimiza-
tion can improve the page load times, reduce buffering events for various
application, improving overall QoE.
SpaceHub is proposed by Meng et al. as an improved relay node for
providing better connectivty and coverage to all devices in a smart home [64].
Spacehub listens to the Wi-Fi signals in surrounding environment and sep-
arates collided signals from the clean signals. It then relays the separated
signals to intended destination without any prior knowledge [64].
2.2.3 Software-defined Middleboxes
With the advancements in SDN, extensive research has been done in vir-
tualization of middleboxes [91]. Traditional middleboxes are specialized
hardware equipments which need to be installed over the line in networks.
These middleboxes are expensive to deploy and maintain and require manual
configuration updates to block new threats. They also need to be periodically
updated to increase the bandwidth and processing power. However, the can
still become bottlenecks in many scenarios e.g. flash crowds.
Sherry et al. have initially proposed the idea of remotely deployed
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middleboxes for traffic anlaysis [100]. They claimed that using cloud resources
to deploy middleboxes reduces the cost of deployment and improves the
scalability. The have demonstrated that this concept can be useful for
enterprise and corporate networks where middleboxes take a huge share
of investment for network infrastructure. Gember-Jackobson et al. have
also developed a implemented a framework for software-defined middlebox
networking [36]. Deidtect, developed by Shanmugam et al., uses SDN for
dynamic traffic steering through remotely deployed middleboxes [99]. This
works envisions a system which can perform dynamic re-routing of user traffic
through middleboxes on demand.
Yu et al. have proposed a system which allows users to remotely request
other network to process their traffic to mitigate any threats [127]. It provides
API to the user which allow him to direct other networks to analyze its
traffic before delivering it to user network. They envision a scenario where
ISPs provide some interfaces using which a user can direct the ISP to handle
its traffic differently e.g. if a user finds some anomaly in its network, it can
direct the ISP to process its traffic via a set of middleboxes before sending it
to user network [5].
One of the key issues with this technique is that it requires user to
actively monitor its network traffic and understand whether or not it is a
security threat. Typical users are unable to perform this kind of monitoring
and decision making for their network traffic. One possible approach is
to automate the detection of malicious traffic in user network. Secondly,
this system supposes that ISPs will provide interfaces to users allowing
them to manipulate how their traffic is handled by ISP. This will be a
strict requirement as ISPs have specially optimized internal traffic handling
mechanism to provide best QoS and quality of experience (QoE) to their
users.
Sherry et al. have also developed a system for performing DPI over
encrypted traffic [101]. DPI is used by a number of middleboxes for analyzing
network traffic. Recent efforts to improve privacy and security for users has
led to most of the websites and Internet based services using encryption
as default standard for communication. New generation of protocols e.g.
HTTPS, TLS etc. encrypt all payload information during transit, therefore,
making it harder to understand the origin of packet and what data is being
communicated. It hinders the ability of most security system which analyze
payload data to identify any malicious data served as response to user
request. However, the method proposed by Sherry et al. uses a novel
protocol and encryption scheme to realize DPI over encrypted traffic. This
technique is applicable for long-lived HTTPS connections and its encryption
schemes perform an order of magnitude better than existing cryptographic
schemes [101].
Bremler-barr et al. have moved proposed architecture for a system which
provides DPI as a service [10]. This technique scans the traffic only once
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and use it for all middleboxes by passing relevant results to corresponding
middleboxes. This approach improves the scalability and robustness of
middleboxes [10]. SDN can also benefits this scheme by allowing dynamic
traffic steering between middleboxes for efficiently sharing scan results from
DPI service.
Qazi et al. have proposed a framework SIMPLE, which uses SDN for dy-
namic traffic steering through set of middleboxes [88]. This system combines
the advantages from middleboxes functioning using information from L4-L7
and combines it with L2/L3 functionality supported by SDN. SIMPLE shows
that using the statistics from middlebox, SDN can very well integrate with
current networking setup [88].
2.3 Commercial Solutions
Recently, a number of products have been launched to improve the user
experience and security in smart home scenarios. These devices are devel-
oped to improve usability experience by providing companion smart phone
applications. Some of these devices use public cloud services to tunnel all
traffic through security services (similar to a VPN). The security service
performs traffic analysis, destination filtering and anti virus protection for
securing user traffic. We discuss some of these devices and their features in
this section.
2.3.1 Google OnHub
Second iteration of Google “onHub” router was launched by Google in
2015 [39]. Onhub is designed to be a faster and stylish Wi-Fi router for home
and office environments. Google onHub uses an array of directional antennas
to ensure maximum coverage across entire home and office to support better
data rates and bandwidth for all connected devices.
OnHub is especially designed to become part of interior decor so that it is
not hidden behind the desk etc., as physical objects greatly affect the Wi-Fi
coverage. OnHub is also equipped with ZigBee [92] antennas to support IoT
connectivity. It also includes a microphone which allow users to setup voice
commands for different device operations.
Google OnHub comes with a companion smart phone application which
enables easy setup, monitoring and setting priorities for connected devices.
This application is also connected to Google cloud for easy updates and
notifications. OnHub is primarily designed for providing better coverage
in home environments and does not offer any security related features as
of now. The functionality of companion application is fairly limited to
generating notifications and monitoring device status. With inclusion of
Nest, Weave [19] and other IoT support, OnHub is expected to improve
its support functionality as an IoT hub. Since, Onhub is mainly designed
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to provide improved connectivity across home, there are limited security
features supported by the device, as of yet.
2.3.2 F-Secure Sense
Sense was initially launched by F-Secure in 2015 [30] and is currently in
pre-order stages. F-Secure Sense is designed to be an improved gateway,
which is convenient to setup and provide some security functionality as well.
It does so by creating a secure network for all devices to connect and performs
constant monitoring to detecting any threats in the network. Since the device
is in developments stages, the final set of features is not available as of yet.
Sense uses a subscription based model for updating the endpoint and
services. There is a companion mobile application available for improving
user experience to control the device. It is expected to perform traffic analysis
(if any) operations on the Sense device itself to protect user privacy. However,
end point based analysis may limit the scope of analysis operations due to
hardware constraints.
2.3.3 Qualcomm Smart Home Gateway
Qualcomm released their smart home gateway platform, which uses a Qual-
comm Internet Processor (IPQ) to enable a robust smart home gateway.
This gateway includes IPQ processor, Gigabit Wi-Fi from Qualcomm VIVE
802.11ac, and Qualcomm StreamBoost technology to enhance user expe-
rience in connected smart homes [89]. The smart home gateway platform
acts as always-on channel for carriers and digital content providers to sup-
port new applications and services including data, voice and video services.
This gateway uses IPQ processing power to manage different complex and
demanding applications. It improves network bandwidth management and
provide useful analytics for application optimization. IPQ also enables gate-
way manufacturers to optimize content delivery and content caching on the
edge.
Qualcomm smart home gateway also provides parental and access control
security features for protecting the traffic inside user network. The gateway
platform also enables third party to optimize their application performance
for end users. However, these gateways are focused on the applications
enabled by processing power available via IPQ processors. They do not
provide any traffic analysis or other security features as of yet. Currently,
there is no information or control available to the user about what processing
is being done, what information from user network is being shared to third
parties.
18
2.3.4 Bitdefender Box
Bitdefender BOX is a network security device for smart home from Bitde-
fender. This solution is a combination of hardware and cloud services to
protect all user devices. Box can be installed in the home or carried along
by the users to protect all their connected devices. It sets up a private
line with Bitdefender cloud to secure user traffic by processing it through
cloud services. Box can also be carried around by the user to get security
connectivity “on the go”. Box connects to available networks in open Wi-Fi
environments maintains a private line to Bitdefender cloud (like a VPN) to
securely channel all user traffic to the Internet.
Box promises to perform vulnerability assessment of user network by
scanning the network and finding any connected devices which can lead to
data theft or other malicious attacks. It also provides complete security
for all device communications by routing it via Bitdefender cloud services.
These services also notify the user if there is any malicious activity detected
during the traffic analysis.
2.3.5 Luma Wi-Fi Router
Luma is a redesigned Wi-Fi router which is easy to install and configure for
normal users [110]. It is designed to provide built-in security and content
filtering services for IoT and other devices in user network. Luma provides a
mobile application for controlling and managing the router itself. Luma router
provides better coverage for home users by using adaptive band steering
technique based on location and data load. However, it shows average
performance during testing when compared with low price alternatives i.e.
mid range Wi-Fi routers [112]. The efficiency of content filtering and built-in
security techniques is also questionable as the device is expected to perform
all these operations using limited resources available. This device also relies
on user to setup security preferences which also limits the efficient use of the
features available on the device.
2.3.6 Dojo Gateway
Dojo gateway was initially launched in 2015 [93]. Dojo gateway is designed
to resolve the security issues in SOHO networks, which are littered with
a number of connected devices. Dojo gateway is an easy to setup device
which requires plugging in the base station into home router and installing a
companion smartphone application. The base station then itself scans the
whole network to find out connected devices and looks for any vulnerabilities.
It monitors the traffic passing through gateway to detect any malicious
activity. User is alerted about any suspicious activity by changing the status
lights on pebble.
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The design choice for Dojo allows users to place the pebble anywhere
around home to get status updates, while the vulnerability assessment box
(i.e. base station) should be placed next to router. The companion application
also shows the detailed information about any potential security threats and
give suggestions to the user about what can be done to avoid these threats.
Dojo gateways manufacturer uses Dojo Security cloud to update vulnerability
assessment box, to make sure that it can detect latest security issues.
Dojo gateway is a passive device which only scans the network for any
vulnerabilities. It does not actively block any malicious activities in the
network but relies on user to take necessary actions. The constant update
of its vulnerability detection abilities via security cloud is a useful feature.
The manufacturer says that Dojo does not collect any PII about the devices
but it uses machine learning and collect meta data information to find new
threats.
The device is expected to cost $199 but is not launched yet, therefore,
there is no performance evaluation available (by the time of writing). It is
handy to notify the user about threats, however, most users do not take
actions or the low level knobs available on common routers makes it too
tedious to perform configuration update task.
The manufacturer does not give any details about what machine learning
techniques will be used and what kind of meta-data information from user
devices will be collected for machine learning based threat analysis. There
is no indication about whether these machine learning algorithms will be
operated on the vulnerability detection modules installed in the network or
in Dojo cloud. There is also no information about what kind of control is
available to the user over the processing of the information collected from its
network.
2.3.7 Cujo Gateway
Cujo gateway is the latest in the series of devices launched to protect home
networks. It provides plug-n-play protection for all devices in the network
including mobile, IoT devices etc. [25] Cujo gateway promises to protect
user’s financial and personal data, device integrity and offers features like
parental and privacy control. Cujo campaign advertises that it can monitor
home network and detect the threats in home network.
It does so by inspecting all the data coming and leaving from the network.
It can detect and block viruses and malwares in the network and its ability to
perform these functions is always improving by constantly adapting to block
new threats. Cujo gateway uses Cujo Cloud to updates its threat detection
services. This requires monthly or yearly subscription from Cujo cloud to
update malware and threat detection mechanism.
Cujo gateway’s campaign page does not give detailed information about
device functioning and what kind of operations will be performed on the
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device. It also does not give any details about what kind of data will be
collected and utilized for these analysis operations and what information will
be transferred to the Cujo security cloud.
Most of the devices discussed here rely on constant monitoring of the
network to detect different kind of threats, malwares or attacks in the network.
Some of them e.g. Dojo gateway etc. uses remote services to update their
ability to detect these threats. Others e.g. Bitdefender Box etc. reroute
all user traffic through their security cloud to actively analyze and secure
any traffic flowing inward/outward from the user network. Although, all
these products provide a companion mobile application which notifies user
about any network threats. However, they do not provide actual control
to the users about how their network should be protected. There is also
very limited support in terms of network management available with these
devices. Table 1 shows a comparison between list of features offered by these
products.
These solutions are designed mainly for smart homes and (currently)
do not provide any scalability model from SOHO to enterprise networks.
Currently available information does not give details about transparency and
control over what kind of data is collected from user networks and how is it
used. If the analysis is performed on edge device deployed in user network,
as claimed by Dojo, Cujo etc., the efficiency of this analysis is dependent
on the limited hardware and training data available on end devices. On
the other hand, if the analysis is performed in service backend, there is no
information about the extra delay and what kind of data from user network
is used for this analysis.
2.4 User Study
Figure 2 shows the demographics of the user study we have conducted with
170+ participants from 25 different countries. The study was designed to get
an understanding of how well users know the risks and threats associated
with all the connected things they use in their daily life. The study also
queried respondents about their willingness to use a system which can provide
automated security and management of their networks. Figure 2 show the
demographics of participants from our user study.
Our respondents belonged to different age groups with diverse occupation
ranging from students to lawyers and doctors. The median education was
Bachelors degree and modal age was 26 − 35 years. Table 2 shows the
compiled results from respondents of our survey.
This survey showed us that more than 70% of the people are using more
than three connected devices in their daily life but a large majority i.e.
≥ 70% are not aware of security and privacy risks associated to these IoT
and smart devices. When questioned about the networking gear, 80% of the
respondents told that they have spent no more than $100 on their home
21
Table 1 Smart home gateway features. Comparison of features offered
by the latest generation of gateways designed to secure IoT and smart homes.
Only Google onHub and Bitdefender Box are currently available in market
(at the time of writing). *LIM: Limited information available, **NA: No
information available
Feature OnHub
[39]
Sense
[30]
Box
[7]
Cujo
[25]
dojo
[93]
Better network
coverage
X X *LIM *LIM **NA
Smartphone ap-
plication
X X X X X
Prevent hack-
ing
5 *LIM X X *LIM
Virus protec-
tion
5 *LIM X X 5
Malware detec-
tion
5 X X X X
Rule based pro-
tection
5 X 5 X 5
Deep Packet In-
spection
5 **NA **NA X 5
Machine learn-
ing
5 **NA **NA X 5
Security fea-
tures
5 X X X X
Automated
Management
X *LIM 5 X 5
Automated Se-
curity
5 *LIM 5 *LIM 5
Device discov-
ery
5 5 5 5 *LIM
Device profil-
ing
5 5 5 5 5
D2D communi-
cation
5 5 5 5 5
IoT specialized X *LIM 5 *LIM *LIM
Price $199 $99 $199 $99 **NA
Subscription **NA $8/M $99/Y $99/Y $9/M
Disclaimer: The data is aggregated from the information provided by the manu-
facturers on official product pages.
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(b)
(c)
Figure 2: Demographics of user study. (a) Number of devices connected
to respondent’s network on average. (b) Average spending by respondents
on network gateway. (c) Respondents included majority of students and
professionals from various fields.
gateways and although 60% of the people think that their gateways do not
provide enough features, 71% have never updated their gateways since first
installation as they find the exercise hard.
According to the survey statistics, 85.2% people think that typical network
gateways should be more easier to operate and they should offer more features
to control device level functionalities. Although current gateways do offer
features e.g. mac address or IP filtering. operating on device level granularity,
the complexity of managing these options makes them unattractive and less
usable for average users. More than 50% of people showed their interest in
a system which offers them to process their traffic using middleboxes and
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Table 2 Survey responses. User’s response about limitations in traditional
gateways and requirements from next generation network gateways and access
points. (Scale: 1: Least Agree, 7: Most Agree)
Scale 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Typical gateways
Lack of easy UI 13.9% 8.1% 11.6% 19.7% 14.5% 12.1% 20.2%
Lack of features 5.2% 6.9% 11.6% 28.3% 20.2% 13.9% 13.9%
Lack of information
for user
8.7% 15% 16.8 20.2% 11% 15.6% 12.7%
Lack of support for
IoT
3.5% 3.5% 9.2% 31.8% 21.4% 17.3% 13.3%
Requirements from gateway
Should be easy to op-
erate
1.2% 1.7% 11.6% 20.2% 16.8% 23.7% 24.9%
Should support de-
vice specific policies
1.2% 2.3% 6.9% 15% 15.6% 24.9% 34.1%
Should support mid-
dlebox analysis
1.2% 4% 4% 35.8% 15% 22% 17.9%
Should have better
data visualization
1.2% 1.7% 63.4% 24.9% 26% 17.9% 22%
Should provide more
feedback to user
2.9% 0.6% 4% 6.9% 12.1% 26.6% 46.8%
90.7% people wanted to have a better utilization of their network and device
activity.
Our respondents explained that the biggest limitation in managing their
gateways and APs is the difficulty in accessing and understanding the available
features. Most of the respondents expressed their interest in a product that
could automatically manage and secure their network. Survey results showed
that people are interested in systems that provide them information about
their device behavior and any malicious activities happening in their network.
Table 3 shows that nearly 70% of the respondents do not have problem in
sharing their network data with any service which provides them security
services and 75% respondents said they will not have any trouble if remote
service updates their network gateway.
Our survey shows us that people are interested in a solution which can
automate network gateways and APs to provide better security with minimal
user interaction required. It also showed that although people are serious
about their data privacy and device security, they find it difficult to manage
these function themselves. Therefore, they will be comfortable to share
their network data with a trusted third party which uses this information
to improve the security of their networks. The amount of money spent
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Table 3 Privacy concerns. Responses for user’s privacy concerns about re-
mote analysis of network data for providing automated network management.
(Scale. 1: Least comfortable, 2: Most comfortable)
Scale 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Concerns
User knowledge of
ISP traffic analysis
32.9% 13.9% 11.6% 11% 8.1% 11% 11.6%
Comfort with ISP
traffic analysis
12.1% 15% 15.6% 36.4% 8.7% 7.5% 4.6%
Comfort with service
based model
4% 9.8% 9.2% 28.9% 30.1% 11.6% 6.4%
Comfort with re-
mote analysis
5.8% 6.9% 13.3% 28.9% 25.4% 14.5% 5.2%
Willingness to re-
place existing gate-
ways
6.9% 6.9% 12.1% 24.9% 20.8% 22.5% 5.8%
by average user on home gateways also gives us an upper bound over the
preferred cost for our system.
2.5 Open Questions
Our literature survey shows that there are various problems with existing
solutions. Academic researchers have proposed various techniques which
are prototyped and tested to work well but these techniques have not been
applied to real world problems and the efficiency of these ideas is yet to be
evaluated at the scale of real world networks. Each of these solutions focus
on a specific problems experienced in networks and there is little to no study
over how these solutions will work in conjunction with each other. To the best
of our knowledge, there has not been an all around solution which combines
individual (focused) solutions to develop a platform to improve traditional
networking gear, which is still using decades old design and protocols.
SDN has become increasingly popular in recent times. However, its
practical deployments are still found only in data center environments [55].
SDN has yet to be adopted in wide scale network deployments in SOHO
and enterprise networks. One of the barriers in wide scale adoption is
cost of devices supporting SDN functionalities. Although, latest generation
networking gear comes with SDN and Openflow (OF) support but only a
few of these devices operate with vastly deployed network gear in traditional
networks.
There have been many proposals to use SDN for redirecting traffic through
remotely deployed middleboxes. There has also been some research recently
to improve the efficiency of these software-defined middleboxes. However,
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there has not been any all around system which could allow large scale
deployment supporting traffic analysis in remote middleboxes.
New generation of products from industry discussed in Sect. 2.3, which
support to oﬄoad security and traffic analysis tasks to a remote service are
also in their infancy. Different promising products have been introduced but
they are not in production yet. These products promise a number of features,
however, their efficiency is yet to be analyzed. The cost of these products is
high and there is no clear scalability model available for them.
Although, the commercial solutions discussed above provide a number of
security features and promise to use fancy machine learning based techniques.
However, they do not give any mention of how to control device interactions in
the network. In order to protect devices from being infected from a malicious
device in the network, network gateways should be able to automatically
detect and limit communications between all devices. The service should also
be able to detect any suspicious device in the network and block it before it
could infect other devices.
Our user study shows that there is a need of a new breed of networking
gear and deployment architecture which allows networks to automate their
management and security. With so many heterogenous devices connected
to our networks, the task of network management has become increasingly
tedious for security experts, let alone the common users. Therefore, we need
an all around system which provides “plug and forget” model of security and
management of networking gear so that we can secure all different kind of
network environments ranging from SOHO to enterprise networks.
Based on these requirements, we have developed a platform which can
provide features such as automated network management, automated network
security, controlled device to device (D2D) communications, selective network
isolation along with user control over his network. Our platform is designed
to be low cost and easy to deploy in different networked environments. We
have discussed the design of our platform components in Sect. 3 and 4. We
have implemented a prototype of our platform to evaluate the performance of
this system in real world deployments. Section 5 gives a detailed discussion
over the performance achieved by our proposed system. During evaluation,
we have also identified the areas for possible improvements of the system.
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3 Securebox
Section 2 discussed the state of the art in network management and security
from academic research. It also presented some of the new devices for securing
SOHO environments using a service based model. Section 2 highlight some
limitations of these solutions and presented open research questions which can
be explored in order to improve network management and security situation.
Cost reduction and performance efficiency are among the two primary
goals for developing the system. Therefore, the proposed system architecture
is based of a service model in which user require minimal equipment to setup
their networks and subscribe for the desired services on the go. New services
can also be tested by users before actually deploying them in their networks.
This approach will reduce the cost for the users to setup and operate their
networks.
The proposed system consists of two primary components i.e. Securebox
and Security and Management Service (SMS). Securebox is an improved
smarter home gateway/AP which is deployed in the network. Here we discuss
the design, architecture and implementation details of Securebox in detail
and the design, architecture and implementation details for SMS are given
in Sect. 4.
Securebox is one of the two key components of the proposed system. It is
a lightweight, intelligent gateway or AP which replaces regular APs used in
traditional network deployments. Securebox is a smart, low cost replacement
for traditional access points which provide connectivity through wireless or
wired medium. Securebox provides a better overview of network activities
for the users and allows them to have a control over their networks.
It provides features such as dynamic traffic management, Quality of
Service (QoS) control, dynamic access control, controlled device-to-device
(D2D) communications etc. Securebox resides in the edge networks and
connects to a service i.e. SMS for performing different operations e.g. traffic
analysis, service mobility management etc. remotely.
3.1 Design
Securebox is conceived as a smart, lightweight, plug-n-play AP which removes
any tedious setup procedure and handles most of the configuration and
operation tasks by themselves. A typical AP used for network deployment
in home or small office networks (SOHO) has a fairly straightforward setup
procedure which does not require any extensive procedures from the users.
However, these APs only provide low level control interfaces (we would call
them “knobs”) which makes it difficult for an average user to make any
changes in configuration.
In a basic setup, these APs allow users to easily connect their devices
to the network but in case an average user wants to make any changes in
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operational configuration, these knobs make that task more painful. These
APs only support a limited set of security options e.g. IP/ MAC blocking
etc. and do not provide control over device activities by supporting device
specific network policies, QoS preferences etc.
Securebox is designed to solve these problems by providing high level
control knobs to their users and handles the low level configuration updates
automatically. These knobs allow users to setup high level policies for their
network e.g. parental control, data-cap for a device etc. and Securebox
automatically translates these high level user preferences to low-level network
configuration changes.
One of the strengths of Securebox design lies in the automation of
configuration tasks as it does not rely on user’s knowledge to handle network
configuration. A majority of users in typical SOHO environments do not
have enough expertise to handle their networks efficiently. They are unaware
of the risks and threats associated with their network and device. Therefore,
users are unable to take respective actions to block these threats. Adding to
that limitation, legacy APs do not support enough features to provide full
control over network operations, to the user.
Securebox also uses an interactive model to involve the users in the
network management cycle. The system notifies the users about their overall
security status of their devices and network. It also notifies the users about
any possible threats to their network and devices, and suggests measures
to mitigate any threats to user’s privacy. Although, Securebox automati-
cally updates network configuration to mitigate most of the threats, these
suggestions and notifications help in increasing user’s awareness about their
security and privacy.
3.1.1 Portability
Portability is one of the important design motivation for making Securebox
lightweight and small in size. Using small form factor PC e.g. Raspberry
PI [111], Omega [23] etc., makes Securebox highly portable for personal use.
Due to its small size, users will be able to carry Securebox and connect
it to any available (insecure) Internet connection e.g. public Wi-Fi, hotel
networks. Users can then connect their devices to the adhoc network by
Securebox. This secure personal access point (S-PAP) setup will prevent
malwares and spywares on the insecure network from infecting user devices.
It also prevents illegal access and hijacking of user’s devices connected to
insecure networks.
3.1.2 Architecture
Figure 3 shows the internal architecture of Securebox. Securebox consists
of an SDN controller for managing networks routing, switching and other
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Figure 3: Internal Architecture of Securebox. SDN controller manages
the flows using network policies stored in local policy DB. The controller can
request SMS to analyze traffic and respond with relevant network policies to
be enforced in the network. User devices can be connected through wired/
wireless interface provided by Securebox and user can also set preferences
using the local management console or web application.
function, switching hardware for providing device connectivity, a management
console for setting up user preferences, a policy database for caching network
policies and a connection to SMS for support in Securebox operations.
At the core, Securebox uses SDN for enabling runtime network config-
uration and security policy updates. SDN controller provides flexibility to
control network operations and configurations updates on the go. In Secure-
box, an SDN controller allows us to implement device and context specific
policies in the network to improve QoS and security of the network. It also
eases the remote administration of Securebox and push policy updates which
are implemented without requiring interaction with the device. The use of
SDN allows us to have a better control over network resource provisioning
and implementing security policies at device level granularity.
Securebox also contains a lightweight database containing most frequently
used network and security policies. This database serves as a cache of network
policies used for managing network traffic at the edge. These network includes
policies configured by user itself, policies received from SMS in response
of traffic analysis request and policies received in policy database updates.
Policy database makes Securebox a stateful AP which can retain its state
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in case of any interruptions. It helps Securebox to perform traffic filtering
operations in cases where the SMS service is not available.
The switching hardware is responsible for providing connectivity to user
devices. Client devices can be connected using wired or wireless interfaces.
Securebox administrates all traffic coming from wired or wireless interfaces
using SDN controller and policy database. Using SDN, Securebox can indi-
vidually control these interface and connected devices with specific network
policies for each interface.
Securebox is a lightweight gateway which offers a set of features e.g.
automated configuration updates, traffic analysis etc. In order to provide
these service, Securebox needs to maintain connectivity to SMS. SMS also
provides resources for performing computationally intensive online/oﬄine
traffic analysis on user traffic. It also provides a set of other functions for the
Securebox discussed in Sect.4 in detail. Securebox preferably should have
constant connectivity to the SMS in order to keep its state updated, however,
it can perform the basic set of operations of a normal AP e.g. network
connectivity, security etc. in the absence of SMS connectivity as well.
3.2 Policy Rules
A network policy or security enforcement rule is a rule used for traffic filtering
on Securebox. A sample enforcement rule a.k.a policy rule, as shown in
Fig. 4, consists of a number of parameters for matching to type of traffic and
setting up priorities for handling the matching traffic. Policy rules are also
used to define QoS, security and other management services implemented
by the network. In the proposed system, most of the policies are sent to
Securebox by SMS, which develops these policies by taking input from a
number of analysis services running in SMS. However, users can also add
custom policies in Securebox to override the automatically provided security
and other services.
Each policy has an associated “time-to-live” (ttl), priority and profile
variable. ttl is used to revoke the policies from the local cache. If a policy
is not used during ttl, it is removed from the local policy database to limit
the size of cache in Securebox. Whenever, a policy is used by Securebox for
some matching traffic, its ttl is reset. Priority value is used to resolve conflict
between two similar policies e.g. if a user and SMS both inject a similar
policy to Securebox, priority decides which policy should be implemented
for traffic management. These rules can be grouped together based on their
profiles i.e. “Regular”, “Trusted”, “Untrusted” and “Strict”. The scope of
policy rules defines the type of traffic on which these rules should be applied.
In the proposed system, user policies have higher priorities compared
to the policies injected by SMS. Policy profile is used for bundling relevant
policies depending on their context and preferences. When a new profile
is setup on Securebox, a set of policies specific to that profile are sent to
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Figure 4: Sample enforcement rule (i.e. network policy).These net-
work policies are cached by Securebox. They can be specified for device(s)
(using device id(s) or MAC address(es)). Each policy has an associated time
to live and it is removed from cache if remains unused for the specified ttl.
Network policies can be grouped together based on their profiles where profile
can be 1: Regular, 2: Trusted, 3: Untrusted, 4: Strict. Similarly, scope of
network policy states whether it is applied to Network local traffic or Global
traffic only or both i.e Any.
the Securebox from SMS (or retrieved from local cache of Securebox). For
example, if a user changes Securebox profile from “normal” to “strict”,
Securebox requests for policies corresponding with strict profile e.g. “a policy
which would block access to any social media website”. When the profile is
changed back to normal, policies belonging to strict profile are removed from
network.
Figure 5 shows the device information received from SMS when a new
device is connected to the network. This information is cached to be used
later for identifying the connected devices and enforcing device preferences
in the network. QoS and network access can be specified for each devices
based on its profile such that Strict profile will allow the device to either
communicate with some (untrusted) devices in the network with no Internet
access. Restricted profile allows the devices to communicate with a limited
set of devices (within the same trust level) with limited Internet access (i.e.
allowed to communicate with specific services).Trusted profile will allow the
device to communicate with any other (trusted) device in the network while
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Figure 5: Device profile received from SMS.This information is stored
locally by Securebox for subsequent uses. SMS can update device profile and
isolation levels as well as (re)specify the subset of devices with whom device
can communicate. The isolation levels can be defined using device profiles
such that 1: Strict, 2: Restricted, 3: Trusted.
having unrestricted access to the Internet. Unknown devices are assigned
Strict or Restricted profile depending on user preferences.
3.3 Functioning
In a typical network deployment, users install a Securebox in their network
and connect the devices to it using wired or wireless interface. Securebox
can be pre-configured to use a specific SMS or the user can subscribe to
any SMS and configure its Securebox to use that service. User subscription
from SMS will include user preference about what services should be used
for traffic analysis, how frequently should user receive policy updates, what
kind of security user wants for its networks etc. A user can register multiple
Secureboxes to itself and have different preferences for connectivity and
services on each of these Secureboxes. SMS can maintain all these preferences
with user profile to ensure similar set of services are provided for the user
across all Securebox deployments.
Figure 6 shows the overview of Securebox operations, follow algorithm 1
for processing incoming connection request.
1. Securebox intercepts any new traffic connection to/from any device
in the network and extracts metadata information from this request.
This metadata information includes 5 tuple information including
source destination IP and MAC addresses and port numbers. Header
information can also be used to setup more fine grained network policies.
2. Using this information, Securebox looks for any matching policy for
the requested connection in local policy database. If a matching policy
is found, Securebox retrieves the policy, extracts the required action to
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Figure 6: Internal functioning of Securebox. Securebox first checks its
local policy database to find a matching policy for the given flow. If no
matching policy is found, it requests SMS to anlayze the connection request
to identify it as a safe or suspicious flow. Securebox caches the response and
updates network configuration to enforce required network state for given
flow.
allow or block the connection request, translates it to respective Open-
Flow rule (OFRule) and installs it on OpenFlow switches (OFSwitch)
from where the request was originated.
3. In case no matching policy for the given connection request is found in
local policy database, Securebox sends this metadata analysis request
to SMS.
4. SMS receives the request, retrieves the user profile to obtain user traffic
analysis preferences and performs required operations to analyze the
incoming request, explained in detail in Sect. 4.2. This analysis can
be performed using middleboxes and services maintained by SMS or
inside middleboxes leased by the user for dedicated traffic analysis.
5. Once the analysis is done, SMS responds to the request with a network
(security) policy which contains the decision to whether allow or block
this traffic. Securebox receives this policy and caches it in local policy
database. When the Securebox receives similar connection request in
future, it will address those requests locally as it will contain matching
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network policies.
6. Securebox then adds corresponding OFRules in the network (i.e. OF-
Switch).
Algorithm 1 Algorithm for processing incoming flow request in
Securebox
initialization
while traffic_flow_request do
metadata← extractMetadata(traffic_flow)
if matchingPolicy ← policy_exists(metadata) then
policy_decision← getDecision(matchingPolicy)
generateOFRule(matchingPolicy)
insertF low(OF_switch, traffic_flow_request)
updateLog(event)
else
policy ← getSecurityPolicy(metadata)
generateOFRule(matchingPolicy)
insertF low(OF_switch, traffic_flow_request)
updatePolicyDB(policy)
updateLog(event)
end
end
Securebox can request SMS for traffic analysis in two different modes. In
first case, Securebox only sends metadata (5-tuple) information for analyzing
whether or not it is a safe connection request and client should be allowed to
communicate with these source/destinations. SMS can anlayze this informa-
tion using malware and threat analysis services, blacklisted server database,
malicious traffic signatures etc. to decide if it is a safe source/destination
to connect. Once Securebox gets the response, it enforces the appropriate
policy in the network.
In the other mode, Securebox can request SMS to provision a dedicated
middlebox i.e. Firewall, IDS, IPS etc. for analyzing user traffic online. In
this case, SMS will retrieve user preferences and provision a middlebox on
request. Securebox will then reroute all its traffic through that middlebox to
the destination and perform live traffic analysis. SMS can also send policy
to Securebox to reroute user traffic through the middlebox in case it finds a
connection request suspicious. As soon as SMS detects malicious activity
in the traffic being analyzed, it will push policy update to Securebox for
blocking the respective source/ destination.
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3.4 Implementation
We have implemented two prototypes for the proposed system. The first bare-
bone prototype for the system was demonstrated at ACM MobiCom 2015 [44]
workshop and Cloud Security Services (CloSe) Workshop 2015 [45]. The
second (improved) prototype will be demonstrated at ACM SEC 2016 [46].
3.4.1 Hardware
We have implemented these two prototypes using two different hardware
devices. It allowed us to verify Securebox’s design independence on the
underlying hardware resources. The first prototype version used FitPC3
machine to run Securebox whereas the second prototype version will use
Raspberry PI 2 (Model B) for acting as a Securebox. Table 4 gives a
comparison between hardware configuration of both these devices.
Table 4 Comparison of hardware resources available with
Raspberry-Pi and Fit-PC3
Raspberry PI 2 (Model B) Fit-PC3 pro Linux
CPU 900Mhz Quad-Core 1.6 Ghz Dual Core
Memory 1 GB 4 GB
Storage SD Card 320 GB
Ethernet 1 5
Wireless None 802.11 b/g/n
USB 4 6
HDMI Yes Yes
Price $35 $533
For system prototype, we have chosen Floodlight SDN controller [74].
Floodlight controller is an open-source JAVA based SDN controller which
provides a useful set of built-in features and allows us to write and add
custom modules for the controller with ease.
There are several other open source SDN controllers available providing a
set of features e.g. NOX [42], FortNOX [84], Flow Visor [102] etc. All these
controllers are developed by the research teams and have very little software
life cycle (SLC) support, developer community support and documentation
available. Therefore, it is relatively hard to incorporate new modules in these
controllers. These controllers also suffer in performance when deployed in
large scale live environments.
Open Daylight is industry standard open-source SDN controller developed
and maintained by Linux Foundation [60]. Open Daylight is developed and
maintained by experienced development team and is performance optimized
for large scale deployments. There is a SLC support and developer community
35
available as well. However, the amount of efforts required to develop new
modules in Open Daylight controller is fairly high as it is designed mainly
for production use. It contains a number of features that were unnecessary
for the current prototype system and requires more hardware resources for
operation. Since, our system is aimed to work on a low cost small form
factor-based PC with minimal hardware requirements, Open Daylight would
not be a suitable choice in this work.
We have chosen to use Floodlight controller for our system prototype
development because of its lightweight and modular design including all
essential features. There is a nice developer community and SLC support
available for Floodlight as well which greatly helps during development
process. The modular design of Floodlight controller eases the addition
and removal of any extension module to the controller. As shown in our
prototype system, Floodlight controller can show decent performance on a
small factor PC e.g. Raspberry PI [111] as well. The built-in modules in
Floodlight controller have also come handy during the development of this
work.
3.4.2 Software
We have written a custom module i.e. Securebox Module, in Floodlight
controller with ≥ 5000 lines of JAVA code. Some open-source libraries used in
development of Securebox module are listed in Appendix A.1. This module
handles device and Securebox profiles, security policies, communication
with SMS via RestAPI. Our custom module can be enabled or disabled via
RestAPI calls to the controller.
Policy database is maintained in memory as a hashtable and periodic
snapshots of this database are stored locally in a JSON file for storing state
of the controller. In future, local policy database can be implemented using
lightweight database e.g. SQLite [4] or NeDB [17] etc. In order to limit the
memory footprint of policy database, each policy has an associated retention
period i.e. ttl. If a policy is not used during this retention period, it is
discarded from the memory and this period is renewed every time policy is
accessed.
The prototype system uses Open vSwitch1 (OvS) for managing network
interfaces on the AP [82]. The Securebox module in Floodlight controller
is responsible for injecting any OFRules in OvS, which are formulated on
the basis of network policies. When OvS sees a new connection request, it
requests Floodlight controller to install an OFRule for this request. Securebox
module intercepts this request to perform analysis operations and install a
corresponding OFRule based on matching network policy.
The management console for Securebox is developed as a set of RestAPIs.
These APIs allows users to receive information about their network state and
1http://openvswitch.org/
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devices as well as configure the network. They are also used to develop web
and mobile applications for controlling the network functions and devices.
Securebox also offers some management features via SMS. User subscribe
to services and setup high level security preferences in their SMS profile
and those policies are later translated to network policies and pushed to all
Securebox registered to the user.
Our proposed system provides a companion smartphone application for
users to monitor device connected to the Securebox at any given moment.
This smartphone application also gives notifications to the user about any
possible threats to the system. The smartphone application is discussed in
detail in Sect. 4.6.
All communications between Securebox and SMS are done over RestAPI
using HTTPS. In order to be able to communicate with SMS each Securebox
must be registered by a legitimate client which is a valid subscriber of SMS.
SMS allows every user to setup their preferences for each of their registered
Secureboxes individually. SMS maintains the common and individual states
of these Secureboxes and push any updates to the Securebox via RestAPI calls.
All communications between SMS and Securebox are secured using standard
secure communication protocols i.e. HTTPS and TLS. Section 4 explains in
detail what measures are taken in order to protect these communicatons and
prevent any attacks on SMS.
Securebox maintains a set of policies which can be specific to a device
and context as well. For a new connection request, Securebox identifies the
set of policies matching to 6-tuple information extracted from the connection
request metadata. If the set includes more than one policies, then Securebox
anlayzes the device and context of connection request to narrow down the
selection to a single policy using longest match rule. This matching policy is
then translated into OFRule which is installed in OFSwitches.
3.5 Deployment Models
Figure 3 shows that Securebox is designed to be a lightweight access point
which contains interface which allow users to attach different devices. On
the other hand, Securebox functionality is implemented as a generic software
component which can be run on any computing hardware e.g. a workstation,
laptop or mid-range AP.
3.5.1 Securebox as an AP
Using this model, Securebox can be deployed as an AP where SDN controller
and OFSwitch are running on the same node where devices are being con-
nected, as show in Fig 7a. Small form factor PC e.g. Raspberry PI [111],
Edison board [54] or OpenWRT enabled APs e.g. ASUS WL500g Premium2
2https://www.asus.com/Networking/WL500gP_V2/
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can be used for this deployment models by replacing their stock firmware
with modified controller software and OFSwitch [48].
This deployment model provides discrete control over network operations
and device activity with more detailed footprint available for device func-
tionality. It provides central view of all connected device across all APs and
supports better security and resource management across the network. On
the other hand, this model requires replacement of legacy APs and gateways
already installed in the network.
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Figure 7: Deployment models for Securebox in SOHO or enterprise
networks. (a) Securebox deployed as an AP where it can provide interface
to connect the devices automatically. (b) Securebox deployed as a super AP
where it allows devices to connect directly, as well as it can manage other
legacy gateways and APs in the network.
3.5.2 Securebox as Super AP
This deployment model allows us to use legacy AP and gateways installed in
the network already and follow an incremental approach for updating the
network. In this model, Secureboxes as AP are deployed only at vantage
points and the edge APs are then connected to this “Super AP”, as shown in
Fig. 7b. All the traffic from old APs will go through Securebox. This approach
supports incremental deployment and reduces the cost of deployment as
legacy networking gear is kept in use. Securebox can be run as software
functionality on server machines and traffic is proxied through these servers.
Securebox application will monitor and analyze any traffic passing through
this machine and block any malicious traffic in the network.
Although this installation allows us to deploy Securebox over existing
network infrastructure, it has some limitations as we lose fine grained control
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over the network and connected devices. This deployment adds a layer of
abstraction between edge clients and Securebox, therefore Securebox cannot
see all the traffic between legacy APs. This issue allows spreading of malware
among edge clients before it can be detected by Securebox. Also, this model
greatly limits Securebox’s control over the network for implementing device
level network policies which can cause compromises in network security and
QoS.
3.5.3 Securebox as a Sensor
Securebox deployed in the edge networks also acts as a sensor to collect
network data. This data can be used for different kind of analysis e.g.
malware, botnet, spam net, network threat analysis etc. This data can also
be used to improve the QoS and Quality of Experience (QoE) for the users by
having in depth information about the devices connected in their networks
and their utilization pattern. Internet service providers (ISPs) run various
kind of analysis over user traffic to constantly improve QoS for the users but
they do not have enough knowledge about the devices connected to the user
network and their usage pattern. Securebox can provide more information
to the ISPs about ground level statistics from user network to help them
optimize network efficiency and provide more specialized services to their
subscribers.
We have discussed the design, architecture, implementation and deploy-
ment details of Securebox. Securebox is an improved gateway to support
automated network management and security services. It uses SMS to pro-
vide these services. Securebox is easy to deploy and operate as it supports
user with high level interfaces to setup their preferences and automates all
underlying configuration tasks. Securebox design uses SDN for its ability to
flexibly control network. The improved design allows us to deploy Securebox
using various hardware platforms and achieve similar performance. The
performance evaluation for Securebox is discussed in detail in Sect. 5.
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4 Security and Management Service
SMS provides service backend for the proposed platform. SMS provides
support to Securebox for performing security, management, traffic analysis
and other tasks. SMS decouples resource intensive and management tasks
from Securebox in order to reduce cost and resource requirement of Securebox.
As discussed before, SMS can be deployed locally and it can also be provided
by a third party services provider just like an anti-virus service provider.
Users can subscriber to this service and configure their Secureboxes to
communicate with this service to recieve security and network configuration
updates, as well as device management etc.
4.1 Design
Figure 8 shows the internal architecture of SMS. “Central server” is the
focal point of SMS as it is responsible for handling all communications from
Securebox. It is also responsible for intercommunication and management
of all internal components. Since, SMS will be deployed in cloud or cluster
environment for better scalability, central server can be distributed across
a number of servers to remove a single point of failure in the system. SMS
also maintains a state-aware replica of central server. This backup central
server will replace central server if it goes down due to an attack or hardware
failure.
“Certification Authority” is responsible for maintaining certificates for
clients and Secureboxes. The communication between Securebox and SMS
may contain user’s personally identifiable information (PII) e.g. web brows-
ing history etc. Therefore, all communications are signed and encrypted
using state of the art web technologies to protect against MITM attacks.
Certification authority also administrates licenses for third party services
which use network data collected by SMS. It can revoke certificates for any
Securebox or third party service as soon as the system detects anomalous
behavior from an actor in question.
All the data collected from Secureboxes, middleboxes analysis etc. is
stored in “central database”. This data is utilized by malware, threat analysis
and other services. SMS also uses this data to provide user and device
management services. The data can also be used by third party services
providers e.g. ISPs, security analysis companies, research teams for analysis
purposes etc. The central database also acts as a feedback loop for virtual
middleboxes and other analysis services operated by SMS to improve their
threat/anomaly detection abilities.
The results of the analysis services are used to update Securebox configu-
rations and middlebox configurations. The feedback loops allow the system
to improve itself and become more robust in detection of new threats and
malwares. This mechanism also provides a self-healing mechanism for the
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Figure 8: Internal Architecture of SMS. Central server receives all
requests from Secureboxes and administrates all services. Certification
authority is responsible for maintaining security certificates for registered
devices and Secureboxes. Middlebox manager is responsible for managing
middleboxes and updating database and service logs. A number of threat
and malware detection, device and user management etc. services are also
provided by SMS to support context and device based network service
depending on user preferences.
system allowing it to recover from any misconfiguration, which harm overall
system performance and increased false positives in threat detection services.
SMS runs a “Logging Service” to maintain logs from all the services
across the system. These logs are analyzed by “anomaly detection service”
and human experts to detect any misbehaving Securebox or third party
services. Depending on the level of anomaly detected, the devices are either
completely blocked by the SMS or moved to quarantine phase where they
are actively monitored before marking them safe or infected. The anomaly
detection service also uses feedback loop to improve its confidence in anomaly
detection and reduce false positives.
“Middlebox Manager” is responsible for managing the deployment of
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middleboxes e.g. FW, IDS, IPS, DPI etc. SMS maintains two sets of
operational middleboxes (OPMs) at any given interval. The first set of
OPMs is used by SMS for running generic traffic analysis for various clients.
These middleboxes can run analyze traffic from more than one sources and
the number of these middleboxes is dependent on the amount of traffic being
processed.
The other set of OPMs include dedicated middleboxes which are leased to
users/clients for analyzing traffic only from one source. Users can setup their
preferences with SMS such that their traffic is always analyzed in isolated
middleboxes. This set will ensure the privacy and no interruption when user
traffic is analyzed. These middleboxes can be controlled and configured by
the user according to their own preferences. SMS will support scaling up and
bringing down the number of these middleboxes depending on the amount
of traffic being analyzed.
SMS also maintains a set of backup middleboxes. The backups instances
are state aware replicas of OPMs, responsible for traffic analysis operations.
If an OPM goes down (due to hardware, software exceptions), the backup
instance (live replica) replaces it to continue traffic analysis operations. SMS
maintains one or more backup instances of an OPM depending upon the
criticality of middleboxes e.g. a middlebox processing latency sensitive data
can have more than one live replicas and a middlebox performing analysis
on general request can have only one backup instance running.
SMS can also use these replicas to estimate the functional integrity of a
middlebox by comparing the result of analysis from OPM and its replicas e.g.
if an OPM is not detecting any threats or attacks but both its replicas are
flagging the traffic as malicious, it should raise a warning. Such anomalies
may be caused due to configuration mismatch etc. In case of such warnings,
“middlebox manager” should promote a replica to replace OP and launch
another replica for the node, if needed.
SMS also provides a number of user, device and Securebox management
services as well. Users can update their service subscriptions, change device
and Securebox level preferences using the services. SMS also provides a web
application and companion smartphone application for managing all these
services and getting notifications.
4.2 Functioning
Since every Securebox is registered against a user, all requests from the
Securebox are handled according to user preferences. Algorithm 2 shows
the operations performed in handling a new request from Securebox. As
an example, if a Securebox requests SMS to analyze a connection request
from CCTV camera at home to connect to an unknown server, SMS would
check the destination server among the list of known trusted servers. If
the destination server is not found in the list, SMS will send a policy to
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Securebox to either block the connection or reroute the traffic via a middlebox
for inspection. The preventive measure taken by SMS depend on severity of
issue and user preference. In case, SMS decides to block the connection, it
will send a policy to Securebox directing it to “drop any traffic from CCTV
which does not go to (specific) well known servers on the Internet”.
Algorithm 2 Algorithm for processing incoming requests in SMS.
bootstrap system, services
launch middleboxes
while incoming_analysis_requests do
info← extractInfo(incoming_request)
if policy_exists(incoming_request) then
sec_policy ← getPolicy(incoming_request)
sendToClient(sec_policy, incoming_request_id)
updateLog(event)
else
user_profile← getUserProfile(incoming_request)
sec_policy ← analyzeRequest(user_profile,
incoming_request)
sendToUser(sec_policy, incoming_request_id)
storePolicy(sec_policy)
updateLog(event)
end
end
Figure 9 shows the internal functioning of SMS when it receives a new
traffic analysis request from one of the Secureboxes. The sequence of op-
erations performed in SMS to address the analysis request are explained
below.
1. User devices initiates a new connection request to www.some-random-
website.com.
2. Securebox extracts metadata information from connection request and
checks its local policy database to find a matching policy.
3. When no matching policy is not found in local policy database, Secure-
box requests SMS central server to analyze the traffic.
4. Central server requests certification authority to verify incoming request,
user subscription and provide user profile containing user preferences.
5. Certification authority obtains user subscription information and pref-
erence from SMS services and responds to central server’s request to
verify incoming request.
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6. Central server requests middlebox manager to deploy a middlebox
for user traffic analysis (based on user preference) and update system
logs. Central server can also check policy database to find if there is
some matching security policy already available. If found, the security
policy is sent to Securebox, without requiring to analyze the traffic in
a middlebox.
It also depends on user preferences if user wants all its traffic to be
analyzed in every case or it only needs a security policy for the traffic.
One of the issues with generic security policies is that it may not satisfy
all user’s preferences e.g. a generic policy will restrict any connections
to any unverified 3rd party app store but a specific user may want
to connect to a specific unverified store, considering all the risks and
warnings provided by Securebox.
7. Middlebox manager sets up a middlebox for user, sends connection
parameter to central server and updates system logs.
8. Central server sends this connection information for middlebox to the
Securebox.
9. Securebox uses this middlebox to analyze the traffic.
10. Secureox can use this middlebox for the lease time and can extend
lease time as well. The middlebox will be taken down if it is not used,
or lease time expires.
11. User device connects to requested website.
12. Securebox caches the policy to address similar requests in future,
13. Middlebox stores the analysis request and related information in
database.
14. Middlebox sends analysis data to policy dissemination module to be
included in next security policy update.
15. The data for threat and malware analysis services is updated.
16. User and device level services and information is updated.
4.3 Implementation
In this work, core SMS is implemented using Python Flask3 framework [41]
with ≈ 27000 lines of Python code and ≈ 3000 lines of HTML, JS, CSS code
3http://flask.pocoo.org/
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Figure 9: Request processing flow in SMS. All flow processing requests
received by central server are verified by certification authority. Depending
on user preferences and subscriptions, SMS repsonds to these requests with a
network policy to be enforced in the network for given flow. These requests
can also be responded with connection information of a virtual middlebox
where client can process its traffic. All information is logged and analysis
results are stored in database, which are later used to generate policy database
updates. These logs are used for anomaly detection engine as well as threat
and malware analysis services.
for web management console using Jinja24 template engine [96]. A list of
other libraries during the development of SMS are available in Appendix A.1.
All the libraries used are open source libraries freely available with Flask
framework.
Python was chosen as the development language for this work due to its
fast learning curve and wide scale applications. It offers different frameworks
to integrate services including web applications and machine learning tools,
therefore, it will be more suitable choice during the extension of this system.
It is also handy for third party tools as well.
Django [13] is also a popular choice for web development in Python but
Flask is better suited for small to medium scale web applications as it is faster
and simpler to develop. It includes most of the features offered by Django
and also has developer community support. We expect central database to
contain huge amount of data collected from various sources, therefore, we
4http://jinja.pocoo.org/docs/dev/
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used NOSQL database MongoDB [20] for setting up central database.
The modules responsible for device, policy and user management are
loosely coupled with each other which allows us to easily replace any compo-
nent from the application. Each modules offers a web-API for easy commu-
nication with other modules and external services. However, all modules use
the central database for storing and retrieving any data.
All requests are handles by the core SMS service a.k.a. central server.
Every incoming request is authenticated by “authorization module”. Autho-
rization module is also responsible for user profile and session management.
Any request from a Securebox that is not registered to any user will be dis-
carded. “User management module” is responsible for managing user profile
and preferences. It contains information about all devices and Secureboxes
registered by the user. This information is used for analyzing every request
recieved by the SMS.
“Device management service” is responsible for registering and main-
taining device information. Users can register their devices and specify
preferences using this service. “Securebox management service” maintains
Securebox registrations and operations. It keeps track of Securebox context,
what devices are connected currently and previously at respective Securebox
and user preferences for this Securebox. This module is also responsible
for pushing policy updates for Secureboxes. Both device and Securebox
management service modules are responsible for storing and pushing QoS
preferences for devices to Secureboxes in user network.
“Policy management service” is responsible for maintaining security and
network policy database. This module communicates with traffic analysis
services to obtain result of traffic analysis on user’s request, formulates those
results in form of network policies and send them to Securebox. This module
maintains a huge database for policies developed as a result of analysis
performed on request of all Secureboxes. This database is used by traffic
analysis module to find any matching policies for incoming analysis request.
Securebox can communicate to “traffic analysis module” either directly
or via central server. This module obtains user preferences from user, Secure-
box and device management modules. It also consults policy management
modules as well to retrieve any matching policies for user request. Securebox
request is responded in form of a policy which is developed by combining
context information, any matching policies and result of traffic analysis. A
copy of this policy is also stored in the policy database.
4.4 Deployment
For our prototype deployment, we are using Kubernetes5 cluster [11] set up
in our university laboratory to deploy SMS, where each service is deployed
5http://kubernetes.io/
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in Docker6 container [53, 122]. Kubernetes is an open-source management
platform for containerized applications. Kubernetesis an easy to deploy
system with built-in load balancing, fault tolerance, service discovery and
other services. It decouples application and management plan to make system
management easier and improve scalability. SMS is able communicate with
Kubernetes via RestAPI and request to launch new Docker containers on
demand.
Docker containers are selected for SMS deployment due to its modular
structure. As mentioned before, all services are loosely coupled from each
other and can be deployed independently. This deployment model improves
the scalability by allowing system to launch more docker instances for a
specific module depending on system load. It also ensures SMS operations
are not halted when one of the components goes down. The proposed SMS
architecture offers three different deployment models.
4.4.1 Third Party Security Service Provider
In this model, a user gets a pre-configured Securebox from third party service
provider. It also offers flexibility for users to add their own configuration
preferences to the Securebox. Service provider can run different kind of
traffic analysis on network traffic based on user preferences and subscription.
Service provider can also share the data collected by Secureboxes and analysis
services to other services providers. This data is valuable for the device
(e.g. IoT, network etc.) manufacturers, service providers (e.g. Netflix 7),
Internet Service Providers (ISPs) etc. to help them improve their products
and services. This data can be used to develop new technologies with built-in
security features offering better user experience and QoS.
4.4.2 ISP-based Deployment
ISPs can also deploy SMS to provide network management services to their
customers. Typically, ISPs provide a home gateway installed at user premises,
which can also run Securebox functionality. ISPs do various kind of analysis
on user traffic to improve QoS and QoE for the end users. All those analysis
can be combined with analysis performed by SMS to provide better security
and network services to the end users.
With Securebox, ISP will also have a better view of devices and their
usage inside user networks. ISP’s adoption of proposed system will be useful
for both customers and ISP. Following this model, customers would not need
to install a new gateway and ISP can get valuable information about the
user networks to offer distinguished and personalized services. It will also
6https://www.docker.com/
7www.netflix.com
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save the cost of deployment and operation for both customers and ISPs and
improve ISP operations.
4.4.3 Private Deployment
Private deployment model is useful for research and enterprise-scale deploy-
ments since it provides a complete control over the infrastructure. In this
model, a client (e.g. enterprise) deploys its own SMS which is responsible
for managing all the Secureboxes. This model provides a central control
interface to monitor and operate the network. All the traffic is analyzed
in a centrally managed infrastructure where personalized traffic analysis
techniques can be applied to the data. Private deployment model removes
any privacy concerns since the network information is not shared to third
party to any external entity, which is desired in enterprise scenarios.
In traditional networks, it is possible to deploy middleboxes centrally at a
gateway location and traffic from different establishments is routed through
the centrally deployed middleboxes. However, these gateways frequently
become bottlenecks, resulting in bad user experience. Such deployments offer
very little flexibility for configuration, management in operational networks.
However, the proposed system will offer more flexibility by enabling
network managers to classify the traffic and change the middleboxes on the
fly. It will greatly improve fault tolerance by significantly reducing downtime
of middleboxes. It also improves scalability of infrastructure during peak
access periods without compromising user experience and network operations.
4.5 Policy Database Updates
Policy management module periodically generates policy database updates.
It follows a proactive approach to push most frequently requested (within a
specific period) network (esp. security) policies to other Secureboxes. These
policy updates are very helpful in reducing traffic analysis load and can
reduce latency experienced by users by many folds. These updates are useful
in handling flash crowd scenarios where all users are trying to access some
unknown popular content.
In such scenario, all Secureboxes will request SMS to analyze traffic to
this previously unknown destination and overload “traffic analysis service”
possibly causing service disruptions and more latency. Pushing policy for
such traffic to the Securebox will result in Securebox handling new connection
requests locally, reducing latency as well as load on traffic analysis service.
This approach is also useful for disseminating security policies in case of
newly discovered threats or malwares.
In general scenario, a new threat can infect many networks by the time
it is patched in the network due to slow configuration update procedure
and manual human intervention required in update procedure. Using policy
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database updates, security policies to block these threats can be immediately
sent to all Secureboxes and readily enforced on the network. There are several
performance advantages of using policy database updates as discussed in
Sect. 5.
4.6 Smartphone Application
The proposed system provides easy to use interface via web and smart phone
applications. Smart phone applications are particularly useful for users since
user can easily operate them via hand-held devices. These applications can
also provide alerts, notifications and suggestions to the users about how their
network activity. Smart sphone applications follow a simplistic design which
provides device information and its security profile in easy to understand
manner for the user.
These applications provide simple controls for setting up security prefer-
ences e.g. allowing/blocking devices, setting up parental control etc. with
single action. Power users can use both web and mobile applications for
setting up specific security preferences for their devices and network. Smart-
phone application also provides security rating and suggestions for the users
to help them protect their privacy and device security.
Figure 10 shows the design of smartphone application. Figure 10a shows
the list of APs (i.e. Secureboxes) registered by the user. It gives the security
rating for the AP in color coded format (green showing best) and the number
of devices connected those AP. Figure 10b shows the detailed view of the AP.
It shows the name of devices connected to AP and their security rating in
color coded format. It also gives option to manually update security policies
at the given AP. Figure 10c shows the list of device registered for the user
itself and their security rating.
Figure 10d shows a detailed view giving detailed information about device
including device IP address, security rating, trust level. It shows the AP
where device is connected and uPSK assigned to the device. The use of
uPSK is discussed in detail in Sect. 6.7. Smart phone application also lists
a set of risk or threats related to the device with a color code representing
the criticality of threat. The application can provide more details of these
threats, possible causes of these threats and techniques useful to prevent
these threats.
SMS is a service which support Securebox during operations by providing
network policies, device, user, mobility management services etc. It also
supports software-defined middlebox deployments to analyze user traffic.
Section 4.4 presents different deployment models for SMS. The evaluation of
system prototype shows that using SMS in the proposed platform architecture
provides many fold benefits in terms of network services provided to the
users and cost of overall deployment.
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(a) List of APs deployed
at user home showing the
number of devices con-
nected to each AP.
(b) What devices are
connected at an AP.
The markers show trust
rating for each device
(Green:best, Red:worst)
(c) List of trusted de-
vices registered by the user.
User can block any de-
vice from accessing the net-
work.
(d) Detailed device infor-
mation including uPSK and
threats related to the de-
vice.
Figure 10: Companion mobile application. The mobile application is
used for setting up user preferences, registering new devices and getting feed-
back about data usage and other network activities. SMS can also generate
notifications for the user about any threats or vulnerabilities associated to
their devices. 50
5 Evaluation
Sect. 3 and Sect. 4 discuss the design and implementation of Securebox and
SMS in detail. We present a detailed discussion for performance of proposed
system across a set of variables. We have used Raspberry PI 2 as a Securebox
and simplified version of SNORT [95] as IDS instance and a Firewall service,
during these experiments. The analysis service including FW and IP filtering
service was deployed in Docker containers in Kubernetes cluster co-located
with SMS.
Stopping criteria The testing was performed by running i iterations
for each experiments until standard deviation converges i.e. the standard
deviation does not change for x latest iterations where x can be any number
of choice (x = 10 in our experiments).
5.1 Latency
Latency is a crucial metric for businesses, services and end users. Reports
show that higher latencies result in significant drop in traffic for services and
businesses [79]. We have evaluated the increase in latency experienced by
the user when using Securebox. We compare these latencies with baseline
cases where no Securebox is used in the networks.
In Eq. 1, L is the total latency experienced with Securebox setup where
bl is the “baseline latency” experienced when clients want to communicate
with an online server/website. ∑ni=1 li is the total latency added during the
process of analyzing the connection request using SMS. In case there is a
policy available in local policy database, this latency will be ≤ 80µ seconds
at 229.54MB/s using a usual Micro SD storage card,
L =
n∑
i=1
li + bl. (1)
In Eq. 1, li is the latency induced by each step of connection request
analysis process e.g. connectivity to central server, request verification,
database lookup, middlebox provision etc. and the overall latency is the sum
of all these latencies,
L =
k∑
i=1
li +
n∑
j=k
lj , (2)
L = l1 + l2 + l3 + ...+ lk +
n∑
j=k
lj . (3)
Equation 3 opens up left hand side of Eq. 1 where li, i  {1, ..., k}, k ≥ 2
are the latencies which can be bounded e.g. l1 is the latency between
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Securebox and central server, l2 is the time taken for request verification
using certification authority, l3 is the time taken by database lookup operation
for relevant security policies.
In Eq. 3, lj , where j  {k, ..., n} are the latencies due to middlebox
operations. These latencies vary according to user preferences e.g. latency
for user who does not process traffic using any middlebox will be lower than
the latency for the user who prefers to process connection requests in FW,
IDS and malware analysis service,
L = dCe+
n∑
j=k
lj . (4)
Equation 4 combines all latencies which can be bounded into a single
variable C. With the current prototype setup, we try to minimize C by
changing SMS design and operations. Policy database updates and local
policy database in Securebox also helps in minimizing the overall latency,
given in Eq. 1, by reducing redundancy of traffic analysis requests.
In order to evaluate the latency experienced by the user, we have tested
different scenarios which include common user routines e.g. web browsing,
VOIP, file transfer etc. The results show that our proposed system only
introduces marginal increase in latency as experienced during the connection
initiation stages. Later on, Securebox is able to achieve similar latency as
experienced using traditional network gateways or APs. All these results
were obtained when with empty local policy database so that actual latency
experienced due to remote analysis can be measured.
The proposed system is expected to increase the latency experienced by
the user as it performs traffic analysis using remotely deployed services and
middleboxes. Sect. 4 explains a number of improvements made in system
design to reduce the latency incurred by the system. In order to minimize
latency overhead, Securebox sends only metadata information (i.e. 5 tuple)
from a new connection request sent to SMS for the first time Securebox sees
the connection request. Any subsequent similar connection requests will be
addressed using the local copy of the network policy received in response
to the first request e.g. when a user accesses a website Youtube8 for the
first time and Securebox does not have a matching policy available in local
database, it will request SMS for analyzing this request. SMS will respond
to this request with a policy for allowing connections to well known Youtube
servers.
Securebox will store this policy locally and use it to address any sub-
sequent connection request for Youtube. This approach results in adding
latency only at the start of loading a web page content, which does not affect
user experience. In our test-bed, the proposed system only increased page
load time for Youtube from 3.53s to 3.81s for the first time.
8https://wwww.youtube.com
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These design approaches also help to control the utilization of uplink
bandwidth available to the user and minimize the number of requests made
to SMS for traffic analysis. These design choices and policy database updates
significantly lower the latency overhead offered by our system.
5.1.1 Web Browsing
Web browsing is most frequent use case for Internet among majority of users.
With more and more data being published on web forums, web browsing has
become integral part of a user’s everyday routine. However, majority of users
access only a handful of websites. If the user experiences abnormal increase
in time taken to load websites, it will negatively impact user experience.
Therefore, Securebox should not significantly increase the overall latency
experienced by the user.
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Figure 11: CDF for HTTP page load times. The test was performed
for Alexa top 1000 websites (as of 31/07/2016). Securebox setup is able
to achieve similar performance as achieved by using traditional networking
setup.
Our system evaluation shows that Securebox is successfully able to
minimize the increase in latency experienced by the user. Figure 11 shows
that the increase in time taken to load popular websites when using Securebox
is negligible.
We have tested the page load latencies for top 1000 websites (as of
31/07/2016) ranked by Alexa9. The latency overhead of Securebox is negligi-
ble in user experience because this increase in latency is experienced only for
9http://www.alexa.com/topsites
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the first time website is accessed. For any subsequent requests to the same
website, user will experience no added latency.
It is also common that websites load handful content from third party
resources. Most of the times these third party resources are similar for a
number of websites. Therefore, the local policy database (i.e. cache) comes
handy in further reducing the latency because the network security policies
for common third party resources are already available in cache e.g. if both
websites A.com and B.com load same content from resources.abc.xyz.com as
well. When user will load A.com, Securebox will also get security policies for
resources.abc.xyz.com which can be used when accessing B.com, therefore
minimizing the latency experienced when loading B.com.
The approach to individually analyze every data source for loading one
page also comes handy in blocking malicious content which is loaded in
background as the user visits a compromised page. Securebox will load the
content for webpage from legitimate sources but will not load any (hidden)
malicious content from untrusted sources.
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Figure 12: Latency experienced for web browsing. The colored lines
show latency experience while using traditional gateway and black lines
showing latency experienced while using Securebox. Initially, securebox
setup introduces high latency due to remote analysis but for future iterations
the latency achieved is same as typical network setup because Securebox has
network policies matching to these flows in local policy database.
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Policy database updates also help in minimizing the latency as each
policy update will contain policy rules for recently popular content. When
a user tries to access this trending content, these request will be handled
locally using policy database and no latency, due to remote analysis, will be
added.
Figure 12 shows the latency experienced for loading popular websites.
The results show that Securebox introduces some delay in the beginning when
the web page is requested for the first time, as the request is anlayzed by SMS.
After initial request, Securebox achieves similar latency for loading these
websites, as experienced in scenario where Securebox is not used, because it
has relevant policies in local policy database. The user will experience initial
spike in latency if the security policy (relevant to the web page) is removed
from the database due to ttl-expiry.
5.1.2 VOIP Traffic
Voice Over IP (VOIP) applications are latency sensitive applications in which
user experience is suffered most due to any latency in connection. Therefore,
we evaluate the performance achieved by using Securebox for VOIP traffic.
We have compared the difference in jitter experienced by user with and
without using our system. Results10 presented in table 5 show that there is
no significant loss of performance due to the use of Securebox.
Table 5 shows that Securebox setup introduces no significant jitter in
VOIP operations and provides consistent uplink and downlink bandwidth for
the application. Both Raspberry PI (R-PI) and fitPC versions of Securebox
achieve “mean opinion score” (MOST) of 4 or above, which shows that the
proposed system can support jitter free good quality VOIP traffic.
These results also show that Securebox design allows us to achieve almost
similar performance using both fitPC and R-PI based versions, although
fitPC3 has better hardware resources. As the Securebox oﬄoads most of the
computational intensive activity to SMS, it does not need more hardware
resources for better performance.
5.1.3 Skype VOIP Traffic
Jitter is an important factor in VOIP traffic, therefore, we evaluate the
jitter experienced for Skype11 calling using Securebox as network gateway.
Skype is popular VOIP client and is frequently used in SOHO and enterprise
environments.
Figure 13 shows three different scenarios where two users, Alice and
Bob, try to make a Skype call with and without using Securebox as network
gateway. The first scenario is a “baseline scenario” representing current
10These tests were performed using an online service hosted at http://voiptest.8x8.com/
11https://www.skype.com
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Table 5 VOIP Performance. In comparison with typical networking
setup i.e. without Securebox, we can achieve similar performance (with
excellent quality) for VOIP traffic with Securebox setup.
C: Client and S: Server.
Parameter No
Securebox
Securebox
(fitPC)
Securebox
(R-Pi)
Mean (±
StDev)
Mean (±
StDev)
Mean (±
StDev)
Download (Mbps) 13.1 (± 0.8) 12.905 (± 0.7) 12.6 (± 0.7)
Upload (Mbps) 2.153 (± 0.1) 1.783 (± 0.1) 1.69 (± 0.1)
Download Consistency 80% (± 1%) 78% (± 2%) 78% (± 2%)
Upload Consistency 86% (± 2%) 83% (± 1.6%) 82% (± 1.5%)
Download BW (Mbps) 18.5 (± 1.3%) 17.7 (± 1.5%) 17.3 (± 0.9%)
Jitter (in ms) (S → C) 3.3 (± 2.1) 5.4 (± 2.1) 5.8 (± 1.9)
Jitter (in ms)(C → S) 5.8 (± 0.8) 5.6 (± 1.2) 5.2 (± 0.9)
Packet loss (C ← S) 0% (± 0%) 0% (± 0%) 0.5% (± 0.5%)
Packet loss (S ← C) 0% (± 0%) 0% (± 0%) 0% (± 0%)
MOS Score 4.3 (± 0.1) 4.1 (± 0.2) 4 (± 0.2)
networks where neither of the users is using Securebox as network gateway,
see Fig. 13a.
Table 6 Comparison of performance achieved for Skype call quality.
The jitter experienced for skype calling does not vary significantly with and
without using Securebox, therefore, user gets uninterrupted VOIP calling
experience.
Jitter (ms) Mean Q1
(25%)
Q2
(50%)
Q3
(75%)
95th
percentile
MOS
Baseline 10.2 9.486 10.2034 10.899 11.480 4.2
Scenario B 10.4 9.679 10.394 10.434 11.169 4.1
Scenario C 10.6 9.972 10.601 11.336 11.445 4.1
Table 6 compares the jitter experienced in different scenarios shown
in Fig. 13. In scenario B and C, users experience slightly increased jitter
due to analysis of initial connection requests in SMS. However, during the
rest of call, jitter is approximately similar as experienced with traditional
network setup. It is because Securebox has all security policies in local policy
database.Average MOS score achieved in both scenario B and C is ≥ 4,
showing that the user experience and video quality was undisturbed [115].
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(a) Baseline scenario, where both users use traditional
gateways installed in their network.
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curebox as network gateway.
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(c) Scenario C, where both users are using Securebox as
network gateway.
Figure 13: Skype test scenarios
5.1.4 File Transfer Performance
File transfer over HTTP and FTP protocol is also an important use case for
Internet users. Compared to Bit-torrent, these file transfers are performed
over direct connections to a server and mostly these servers co-host similar
content. Therefore, only a few connection requests are analyzed by Securebox
and local policy database, once again, helps in lowering delay in file transfer.
Figure 14 also shows that Securebox increases the file transfer time by only
a negligible amount.
Table 7 File size (in MB) for FTP/HTTP performance testing.
File1 File2 File3 File4 File5 File6 File7 File8
154 205 269 996 133 818 952 478
5.1.5 Bittorrent Traffic
Peer to Peer (P2P) traffic is an interesting use case for Securebox, as P2P
clients makes parallel connection to multiple sources. These connections are
repeatedly updated and some of these sources may not be secure to connect.
As Securebox analyzes new connection requests, in worst case scenario, the
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Figure 14: Performance for HTTP/FTP protocol. Comparison of time
taken for file transfer using HTTP/FTP protocol while using Securebox as
network gateway.
number of these connections requests to be analyzed can be significantly
high when using P2P traffic, causing high delays in file transfer.
Figure 15 shows the comparison between time taken for downloading a
file using Bit-torrent protocol [85] with and without using Securebox. The
results show that Securebox does not substantially increase download times.
Additionally, Securebox secures client from connecting to any data sources
which may be compromised or serve malicious content.
5.1.6 IPerf
Figure 16 shows the performance difference experienced for bandwidth testing
when using Securebox. These tests are performed using two IPERF servers.
Server 112 is hosted by FUNET cloud providing connectivity to test bed and
Server 213 is hosted in Amazon EC2. The results show that there is ±3%
impact in bandwidth and throughtput achieved when using Securebox. Once
again, the performance of Securebox is similar for R-PI and fitPC based
versions.
5.1.7 Processing and Memory Overhead
Securebox allows user to setup context based network preferences on per
device granularity. Setting up these network preferences may require a large
number of network policies to be used for traffic filtering. Based on these
12iperf.funet.fi
13iperf.scottlinux.com
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Figure 15: Performance for Bittorrent traffic. Comparison of time taken
for file transfer over Bittorrent protocol with and without using Securebox
shows that Securebox does not introduces substantial delay as the data is
exchanged with several other nodes (i.e., several parallel connections). It has
added benefit of protecting user from untrusted servers serving malicious
content.
preferences, there will be only one matching network policy which should be
enforced in the network for any given flow. In order to minimize the time
required to find this matching policy, we store network policies in a hash table
structure so that matching policy search takes constant time. Figure 17a
shows that the latency experienced during communication among D1, D2,
D3 is not affected by the number of policies used for filtering network traffic.
We have also measured the affect of total number of concurrent flows
in the network over the latency experienced in the network, see Fig. 18a.
Figure 18b shows that the CPU utilization for Securebox only increases
marginally with the number of concurrent flows in the network. Figure 17
and 18 shows that Securebox does not require high processing or memory
resource for carrying out network traffic filtering operations. Therefore, it
can be deployed using limited hardware e.g. Raspberry PI etc.
5.2 Selective Isolation
Securebox provides support for selectively isolating traffic from different
devices in the network. It is an essential feature for mitigating security threats
in IoT or public networks with hundreds of untrusted devices connected
to the network. Figure 19 shows how selective network isolation can limit
D2D communications between untrusted (potentially malicious) and trusted
devices in the network.
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Figure 16: IPerf bandwidth testing, “iperf.funet.fi” is hosted by FUNET,
Finland and “iperf.scottlinux.com” is hosted at Amazon EC2.
5.3 Phishing Attack Prevention
Phishing attacks are very common these days, where attackers setup fake
webpages closely resembling to legitimate websites [26, 3]. Users are directed
to these pages through DNS injection attacks and compromised routers.
When a user connects to these malicious websites, attackers infect their
machines by serving malicious scripts running on the webpage [61]. These
websites also serve malicious content to the user which can infect their
devices [40, 14]. Attackers can also steal user passwords, credit card and
other PII through these fake websites [65].
One critical advantage of Securebox is to block such attacks by dynami-
cally inspecting the destinations where user is connected. Securebox prevents
any attempts for connecting a user to a fake destination appearing as un-
trusted. This features also prevents user from downloading malicious content
from untrusted sources (i.e. other than official content provider) e.g. if a
user wishes to a download some content or install a smartphone application
and a google search redirects it to a 3rd party app store instead of legitimate
source e.g. Apple App Store14 or Google Playstore15, Securebox would block
this attempt and notify the user that an attempt to (possibly) download
malicious content has been blocked. This information will help users to avoid
illegal third party marketplaces serving malicious content.
Figure 20 also shows one such scenario where a user tries to connect to an
online portal for shopping sports accessories. Figure 20a shows a legitimate
page for the online shopping portal and Fig. 20b shows the malicious page
14https://itunes.apple.com/en/app/apple-store/
15https://play.google.com/store
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Figure 17: Overhead for filtering policies. (a): The latency experienced
by the user is not related to the number of network policies used for setting
up traffic filtering or QoS in the network. (b): The overhead of storing
network policies does not increase the memory footprint of Securebox.
served by attacker. Both these pages look almost similar except for the web
address (highlighted in top left corner). An average user will be unable to
identify this difference as malicious page and becomes a victim of attack.
On the other hand, if user is using our proposed system, the Securebox
will detect that the response for user requests is delivered by an untrusted
source. It will block this attempt and notify the user about possible phishing
attack, as shown in Fig. 20c. This notification will also be delivered via
smartphone application. Such notifications will also help users to understand
online security threats and improve their ability to become a victim in such
attacks.
5.4 Privacy
Privacy is one of the most important concerns raised by the proposed system
as the system uses offsite traffic analysis services. This requires sending
user browsing information including source/destination IP addresses which
may reveal user activity. Our proposed model is based on the trust relation
between the service provider and user. It is the same model used by VPN,
anti-virus or any other services where user trusts the service provider for
maintaining user’s data and privacy.
In case of VPN, user traffic is rerouted through service provider network
who provide secreacy to user traffic from unwanted sniffers but VPN service
provider can look at user browsing activity. Similarly, anti-viruses collect data
from user’s machines and send it to their cloud services for their analysis
operations etc. Recent research has shown that it is difficult to provide
complete accountability and management services while offering complete
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Figure 18: Overhead for filtering policies. (a): The latency experienced
by the user is not significantly affected by the total number of concurrent
flows in the network. (b): The increase in number of concurrent flows does
not significantly impact the CPU utilization for Securebox as well.
anonymity of the users [31].
During this work, when we asked respondents in our user study about
“How comfortable would you be in sharing your network information to
get network security and management services?”, a majority (≥ 60%) of
respondents said that they would be comfortable with their data being
analyzed by a service provider for better QoS, security and automated
network management. The functioning of SMS is similar to an ISP which
also performed various kind of analysis on traffic to improve QoS, however,
SMS give more transparent control to the user over what kind of analysis
are performed on user traffic.
5.4.1 Metadata Sharing
The proposed system design tries to minimize the privacy concerns about the
system. Securebox only send metadata information to SMS for traffic analysis
request. This contains only header level information (no payload information)
which can be seen throughout the packet’s route to its destination. Therefore,
SMS services would not track session lengths, payload information etc. from
this data. The choice of sending only metadata information also helps in
reducing latency and efficiently utilizing uplink bandwidth from the user.
If a user wants to analyze all incoming/ outgoing traffic through some mid-
dlebox, his/her traffic is directly channelled through a dedicated middlebox
as per user preference. SMS will be responsible for updating configuration
for this middlebox but no user related information is extracted from the mid-
dlebox to ensure user privacy. User can chose to opt-out from contributing
any threat information detected by that middlebox into threat database. It
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Figure 19: Selective isolation. Securebox is able to enforce device spe-
cific network isolation by dynamically restricting communications between
untrusted (D4, D5 in this case) and trusted devices, to prevent potentially
malicious devices from infecting other device(s) in the network.
shows that the system is designed to make an optimal trade-off between user
privacy and usable security and provide maximum control to users over how
their data is used.
5.4.2 Policy Database Updates
Policy database updates is another useful feature for protection of user activ-
ity privacy. The updates contain policies for frequently analyzed connection
requests from all Securebox deployment. Zipf’s law probability distribu-
tion [86] suggests that majority of user traffic should be directed to only a
handful of websites. SMS can easily detect most frequently visited websites
by its users and it can send relevant security policies for these destinations
in single policy database update. It will allow Securebox to handle majority
of connection requests locally by Securebox.
When majority of traffic is being handled locally by Securebox, the chances
of tracking user activity via analysis requests from SMS are significantly
minimized. Therefore, privacy concerns are lowered when there is only a
minor percentage of user’s traffic is analyzed remotely.
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(a) Original webpage for online shopping
portal requested by the user (b) Malicious page served by an attacker.
(c) Securebox blocking attempt of phishing
attack via malicious page of legitimate
shopping portal.
Figure 20: Securebox preventing phishing attack. Although the ma-
licious page served by an attacker is visually similar to original web page,
Securebox is able to identify it as malicious using the server information
hosting this page. It can therefore block the attack and notify the user about
possible phishing attack.
5.4.3 Privacy Supporting Deployment Models
Our proposed system design offers multiple deployment models to deal with
privacy challenges. Typically, enterprises are very sensitive about what data
is being shared from their network, as it can be of sensitive nature. To
address these concerns, SMS can be deployed by the enterprise locally. This
choice will provide a number of advantages to enterprise as it can minimize
the latency by many fold using a local optimized setup. It will also provide
more control to the enterprise to run dedicated services for their traffic
analysis and (re)implement these services based on their own preference at
any time.
Enterprises usually maintain a data center to process their customer and
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business data. SMS can be deployed using the resources available in this
data center. It will also reduce deployment and operational cost. Enterprises
can meanwhile use third party services to improve the efficiency of their
in-house SMS for detecting latest threats and attacks. The prototype SMS
is also designed to run on commodity PCs, therefore, an average user can
also run lightweight SMS on his own machine inside his SOHO network.
5.4.4 Privacy-aware Data Sharing
SMS design includes that user data is used for improving overall security
and it can be shared with third party services for research and analysis
purposes. However, users can opt-out of this data usage/sharing program
by paying a subscription fee for any services they use. On the other hand,
service provider can offer free services to the users/ subscribers who allows
the service provider to use and share their data for third party analysis etc.
5.5 Collaborative Approach for Network Security
Lack of collaboration is the one of the important problems with network
security currently. As mentioned before, lack of collaboration between security
teams can help adversaries to use similar attack mechanism to successfully
launch attacks against a number of organizations and the security teams
in each of those organizations have to individually detect and block these
attacks.
Although network security solutions have constantly improved over the
last two decades, lack of collaboration between network security teams
requires security experts to make repeated efforts to detect similar attacks.
These attacks often remain undetected for a significant period of time which
is enough for attackers to infect networks and cause damages [27].
The collaboration between network security teams is greatly limited due
to organizational and legal reasons. However, enhancing these collaborations
can greatly help in improving the overall network security situation. Security
community has long acknowledged the need for a mechanism for sharing
network attack related information and there exists an IETF working group
developing protocols for sharing information about network attacks [52].
Improving the collaboration between networks to improve the overall
network security situation is one of the most important design goals of the
proposed system. In general, the compromised devices in SOHO networks can
be used in DDoS, spam attacks launched against enterprises and consumers.
The information obtained from these networks can be useful to block DDoS
attacks launched against enterprise networks. ISPs can use the information
about compromised devices to prevent them from becoming part of any
DDoS or spam net in the first place as well.
The proposed system is built on the idea to use the information obtained
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Figure 21: Network attack simulation environment setup. We use a
set of zombie nodes and a set of interconnected networks with user devices.
Zombie nodes are used for attack each of these networks one after another.
The attack scheme followed for each network is similar as well.
from the network segments to protect the whole network. It gives us a
platform for improved sharing of network information to promptly detect
and block rogue network nodes or segments.
Figure 21 shows the layout of a typical network deployment using Secure-
box setup. Each network segment can represent an enterprise, SOHO or any
organization’s network where each Securebox, acting as a gateway, is also
connected to external (cloud-based) security service i.e. SMS.
Figure 21 also shows a number of zombie nodes which are connected
to various other networks. Such nodes can be controlled by an attacker to
work in unison for launching an attack [40]. These zombie nodes are used to
launch various attacks against these network segments.
Typically, an attacker can use same set of nodes to launch the attacks
against any of these three network segments and in each network, network
security teams would need to first identify and block the attacks in their
network. As explained before, the time taken by network security team to
identify (if possibly) all these infections and quarantine them will be enough
for attacker to cause significant damages.
Figure 22 shows the traffic analysis situation for the three network
segments in a situation where all three network are attacked using similar
mechanism and no information about these attacks is shared among networks.
Figure 22a shows that all the traffic received is initially analyzed. As
the SMS analyzes the incoming traffic and detects an attack, it directs
Securebox to drop the traffic. Figure 22a shows that initially the traffic being
dropped was zero and as soon as the attacks are identified, the volume of
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(c) Traffic trace from Network 3.
Figure 22: Network traffic traces from three network segments. With
no collaboration in place, traffic from each network needs to be processed
separately to identify the attacks. It is a slow approach, taking long time
before identifying a threat and enforcing mitigation policies in the network.
traffic dropped increases. The volume of traffic being analyzed also decreases
because once SMS pushes the policy for dropping the traffic (from specific
source/destination) to the Securebox, any traffic matching this policy is
dropped directly. Similar situation happened in other two network segments
as show in Fig. 22b and 22c.
Although the SMS blocks any attacks as soon as they are discovered,
this approach has some disadvantages. First of all, SMS receives similar
anlaysis requests from different networks and wastes resource to (re)analyzing
these requests. Also, these requests utilize uplink bandwidth from the user.
Although, we keep uplink bandwidth utilization to minimum by only sending
necessary information for anlaysis, however it uses some resources nonetheless.
Lastly, attacker might have infected the network already before the attack was
detected (port scan attack takes some time to detect as it is uses legitimate
request to make connections to various ports).
In order to resolve these issues, we implemented collaborative scheme to
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(b) Traffic trace from Network 2.
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(c) Traffic trace from Network 3.
Figure 23: Performance gain by using collaborative approach for
network security. As the network information is shared to other networks
after the attack is identified in Network 1, other networks immediately start
to drop traffic from (identified) malicious nodes. Therefore, the amount of
traffic processed for Network 2,3 is substantially lesser than Network 1.
spread attack prevention information across networks using policy database
updates. The updates are periodically generated and contains network
policies to block recently discovered network attacks. These policies are
cached by Secureboxes locally and used to block any malicious traffic without
needing to request SMS for analyzing this traffic. It lowers the resource usage
at SMS and further minimizes the uplink bandwidth utilized by Securebox
for analyzing traffic.
A critical advantage of using this technique is that Securebox blocks
the malicious traffic as soon as it is first received at the gateway without
waiting for traffic analysis. Policy database updates also improve Securebox
efficiency by allowing it to handle most of the incoming traffic locally, which
in turn minimizes the overall cost as analysis cost is directly proportional to
the volume and type of analysis performed on user traffic.
Figure 23 shows the performance gain by using this approach. When
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attacker launches an attack on Network 1, all traffic is analyzed (just like
previously) until the attack is discovered, leading to increase in dropped
traffic, see Fig. 23a. After the detection of attack in Network 1, SMS
generated a policy database update for all Secureboxes which was cached by
Securebox 2 and 3. This update included policies developed to block any
malicious traffic received from attack (zombie) nodes (identified in previous
attacks).
When attacker launched similar attack on Network 2, Securebox already
had policies to block any traffic from malicious nodes. Therefore, the volume
of traffic dropped is significantly higher as compared to Network 1 from the
beginning. Network 2 also analyzed traffic coming from other attack nodes
which were not detected during attack on Network 1 due to their recessive
activity. SMS combines the information from attacks on Network 1 and
Network 2 to identify new nodes participating in the attack. Figure 23b
shows that the traffic analyzed by Securebox 2 is significantly lower which
proves the advantage of using collaborative approach.
After the attack on Network 2, SMS generates another policy database
update containing policies to block newly discovered attack nodes. There-
fore, as shown in Fig. 23c, Securebox 3 is able to handle almost all traffic
locally with very little traffic analyzed by SMS because Securebox 3 had
relevant security policies available in local policy database. Figure 23 shows
that collaborative approach of sharing network attack information used by
proposed improves efficiency and robustness of proposed system.
5.6 Policy Database Updates
Figure 24 shows the trend of analysis requests when there is no information
sharing of attacks via policy database updates. When an attacker launches
similar attack against all three network segments at Event 1, 2, 3 respectively,
each of these attacks is blocked after individually analyzing the traffic and
detecting an attack. The analysis engine is required to performing same
analysis repeatedly to detect same attack, resulting in inefficient resource
utilization.
Figure 25 shows the advantageous of our proposed approach of using
policy database updates to share attack information. When the attacker
launches an attack against network 1 at “event 1”, it is analyzed by SMS,
detected as an attack and blocked at “event 1a”. At “event 2”, SMS publishes
a policy database update for all subscriber networks, which includes the
security policy to block attacks similar to the one detected in “event 1a”.
These policies are cached by all Secureboxes and when attacker launches
similar attacks against networks 3 and 4 at event 3, 4. These attacks are
readily blocked using cached policies, without requiring to analyze the traffic.
Network 1 also blocks repeated any attempts of some attacks launched from
same set of “zombie” nodes
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Figure 24: System with no policy database updates. When no policy
updates for sharing network information, system needs to individually analyze
traffic and identify network attacks.
Issues
This approach can result in blocking many legitimate nodes which some-
how become a part of zombie network. In order to prevent the blocking
of such nodes permanently, priority value and ttl counter is associated
with each of the policies in policy database update, as discussed in Sect. 3.2.
Using ttl, unnecessary policies are revoked from Securebox.
Since zombie nodes are legitimate nodes working under the influence of
an attacker, it is possible that these policy updates can lead to unintended
loss of connectivity with legitimate nodes e.g. if Alice and Bob are living
in same dorm and routinely share project work, media files with each other.
If Alice’s computer is compromised by a virus and has become part of a
botnet, outside the knowledge of Alice herself. Bob’s Securebox received
an update, marking Alice’s computer as part of botnet and prohibiting any
communication between Alice’s and Bob’s computers. In future, if Bob or
Alice want to share any files directly with each other, Bob’s Securebox would
deny such connections.
In such scenario, Bob’s Securebox will generate a notification for Bob
that there is a connection request to/from Bob’s computer to a malicious
machine (i.e. part of botnet), which has been blocked. Such notifications will
inform users about the devices which have been infected. Bob can share this
information with Alice who could then take necessary actions to disinfect her
PC. These notifications can also help users in securing their devices and take
precautionary measures to ensure the protection of their device in future
through various means e.g. installing anti virus, not connecting (possibly)
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Figure 25: System with policy database updates. Security policies are
disseminated to all networks at Event 2, after attack on network segment 1
is identified i.e., Event 1. Therefore, attacks on network segment 2, 3 Event
3, 4 and subsequent attacks on network segment 1 Event 5 are immediately
blocked without needing to analyze the traffic.
malicious USBs, etc.
5.7 Quality of Service and Bandwidth Optimization
Securebox is designed to provide easy management of network resources
based on device prioritization. It also users to set high level preferences to
prioritize traffic from some of the devices in the network, to enhance user
experience. For this purpose, Securebox provides mobile and web application
for users to setup these preferences. SMS will ensure that all Secureboxes
register to the user have policies dictating latest user preferences at any time.
We evaluate the functioning of these features which allows users to prior-
itize devices so that Securebox can automatically change network bandwidth
available to these device when connected to the network.
Figure 26 shows a typical network where all devices get equal share of
the available bandwidth. This distribution can affect user experience e.g.
a user is more concerned about video quality on live stream and he can
compromise on background file synchronization tasks for better quality of
streaming video. In such cases, although users can manually configure file
server to move file synchronization to (specific) night hours to get better
web browsing experience during leisure time but this manual management is
too complex for typical users and becomes more tedious as the number of
devices grow.
Therefore, Securebox allows user to setup device priority by a single action
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Figure 26: All devices share equal bandwidth in typical network.
at any time. Our proposed system will use these priorities to synchornize
users preferences on its registered Secureboxes to allocate bandwidth to each
device connected. Securebox summarizes all low level configuration changes
into a simple user action which sets the priority for any device and network
can adapt to those changes.
Figure 27 shows the dynamic bandwidth allocation depending on device
priorities. The measurements were taken while simulating a typical home
network where multiple devices are connected and being used simultaneously
and user have different priority for each of these devices.
Figure 27 shows that initially smart TV’s’s bandwidth was increased as it
started streaming HD video. At timestamp = 15, user starts web browsing
on Phone 1 which increases bandwidth allocated to Phone 1. Meanwhile, the
bandwidth for file server decreases. At timestamp = 25 , user starts using
his laptop for web browsing/video streaming. Since, the laptop has highest
priority, the bandwidth for smart TV is reduced and laptop gets largest
chunk of available bandwidth. Smart TV streaming ends at timestamp = 30
and user stops web and video streaming on laptop at timestamp = 45. When
no device is not being used, equal bandwidth is allocated to all these devices
again.
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Figure 27: Dynamic bandwidth allocation using Securebox, where traffic
from individual devices get bandwidth share depending on user preferences
and priorities.
5.8 Dynamic Access Control
Sect. 3.1 discusses the ability of Securebox to dynamically restrict device
communications in the network. Securebox can automatically allow/block
device from communicating in the network, based on their activity and user
preferences. Securebox also allows client to allow/block network access for
any device using web/ mobile application. Figure 28 show one such example
where device access is barred from communication in user network.
Figure 28 shows that initially all devices are allowed to communicate
in the network but device 2 and 3 are blocked at timestamp = 10 and
timestamp = 30 respectively, due to suspicious activity or user preference.
Blocking these devices increased the network bandwidth share available to
other three connected device. At timestamp = 40, device 1 is quarantined
and again allowed access to the network, changing the bandwidth available
to each device.
Securebox can also block devices from communicating to online servers
depending on the security policies received from SMS. These security policies
depend on the analysis performed by SMS, user preferences, context of
Securebox. Figure 29 shows one such scenario where web access is blocked
on user device due to some malicious activity or user preference. The device
traffic shows the network access for the device is immediately lost as soon as
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Figure 28: Selective network isolation using Securebox showing network
access to individual devices can be blocked and released dynamically (due to
security threats or user preferences).
the Securebox restricts device’s access to the network. Network connectivity
is restored once the device is quarantined and Securebox reconfigures the
network policies.
Device and network connectivity restriction tasks are handled automat-
ically by Securebox using SMS intelligence. Securebox also provides easy
interface for users via mobile and web application to perform these tasks.
5.9 Cost Efficiency
Typically network middlebox costs from hundreds to thousands of dollars a
piece, depending upon supported bandwidth, functionalities and processing
capabilities. After initial installation, these middleboxes require a team of
experts to configure and manage these middleboxes. The life cycle for each
middleboxes is around 3-5 years after which they need to be upgraded.
With current advancement in technology and ever increasing bandwidth
available, the update cycle is now reduced. These upgrades come at cost of
thousands of dollars in terms of hardware upgrade as well as the trainings
required for network security to upgrade their networks and operate new
devices. Update cycles are also very slow due to number of requisition and
planning phases involved.
Large enterprises and big organizations have enough resources to handle
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Figure 29: Dynamic web(content) filtering. Securebox automatically
blocks communications to untrusted remote destinations to prevent users
from connecting to servers serving malicious content. It can also help in
controlling phishing attacks by allowing users to connect to trusted services
only.
deployment and operational cost of specialized network hardware. However,
small business and home users lack the resources to do similar arrangements
(even at lower scale) for their own networks. Our system has therefore
proposed a cost efficient way of resolving these models. Our setup only
requires low cost (≤ $50) piece of hardware to be installed as network
gateway.
If a service provider provides SMS subscription ≈ $10 a month (average
cost for Bitdefender Box [7], F-Secure Sense [30], Dojo [93], Cujo [25] etc.),
user will spend ≈ $600 over the course of 5 years to use the traffic analysis
and management service. Users can also lower the cost of subscription if
they operate SMS locally.
On the other hand, a basic firewall enabled router will cost ≥ $300
with no software updates, management service, SLC support and frequent
update cycle. The manual configuration overhead for such firewall greatly
undermine their potential use in SOHO networks. A solution from Radware
i.e. Radware Defense Flow [90] (similar to proposed system) for DDoS
protection would cost ≥ $10000. This solution is also designed for large scale
enteprise deployed and has strong privacy related concerns.
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Enterprises have a number of middleboxes of various kinds deployed in
their networks which may cost more in hundreds of thousands of dollars [100].
These middleboxes are typically deployed at ingress/egress points of enterprise
sub offices and network team can only administrate them at the granularity
of enterprise sub offices.
This cost can be greatly reduced by using our proposed system as it
requires a Securebox at each vantage point. SMS deployment would require
experts to maintain and improve the system but the number of human
resource required to maintain this setup will be greatly reduced as it can be
operated (automatically) through a central management console.
The configuration update cycle will be smooth and less expensive as
there is little to no human intervention required for configuration update of
end devices. Hardware upgrades are also cheaper as the Securebox can be
easily replaced and costs only a few dollars. The options available in small
form factor PC market are always improving and prices are getting lowered,
therefore new Secureboxes might cost less and be more efficient.
Enterprises can then deploy SMS in their own perimeter using public/pri-
vate cloud. SMS service can also be deployed using enterprise servers instead
of dedicated infrastructure. SMS can be readily updated to support new
analysis and threat mitigation techniques. These updates does not require
physical upgrade of network infrastructure i.e. Secureboxes, hence reducing
the cost of upgrade by many folds.
5.10 Scalability
Flash crowds are common place these days and these situations can result in
middleboxes becoming a bottleneck for the network [70]. These bottlenecks
can cause serious business damages to the organizations. In order to minimize
such instances of middleboxes becoming bottlenecks, extra middleboxes are
deployed in the network. However, a great majority (≥ 50%) of those
middleboxes are under utilized at any given time of normal operations. This
results in wastage of resources. Small and medium enterprises may not have
enough resources to deploy such standby middleboxes for dealing with high
traffic scenarios.
In order to deal with these issues, our proposed system offers a scalable
model for traffic analysis without making middleboxes as network bottleneck.
Using cloud or server-farm resources and virtual middleboxes, the system
can automatically launch and take down middlebox instances. The number
of instances of middlebox running at any given time depends on amount of
traffic being analyzed. Using information from the global view of network
activity, SMS can also predict the flash crowds and deploy more middleboxes
for traffic analysis.
This scalable approach can also significantly cut down the operational
cost of the network management setup because resources used for traffic
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analysis at any given instance are bounded by volume of traffic anlayzed.
It also deals well with flash crowds scenarios where more middleboxes are
readily deployed to analyze extra volume of traffic.
Figure 30 shows the three instances running for performing traffic analysis
on incoming requests. Initially, all requests are handled by instance I but
when the CPU load crosses pre-set threshold of 80% CPU usage, new analysis
request are redirected to instance II. Therefore, the load is shared between
two instances of analysis service. The CPU load for instance I, II again
reaches threshold at “Event 2”. At this point, new traffic requests are
redirected to instance III. These results show that system can scale efficiently
to coup with the load of incoming traffic analysis requests.
0 50 100 150 200 250 300
0
20
40
60
80
100
U
sa
ge
(%
)
Instance 1
0 50 100 150 200 250 300
0
20
40
60
80
100
U
sa
ge
(%
)
Instance 2
0 50 100 150 200 250 300
Time (s)
0
20
40
60
80
100
U
sa
ge
(%
)
Instance 3
Ram Usage
CPU Usage
Threshold
Latency
Event
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
L
at
en
cy
(s
)
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
L
at
en
cy
(s
)
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
L
at
en
cy
(s
)
Figure 30: Scalability in middlebox instances, Event 1: Instance 1
reaches threshold, so analysis load is (partly) redirected to Instance 2. Event
2: Both Instance I, II crossed threshold (80% CPU utilization), requests for
analysis (partly) redirected to Instance III.
For SOHO and small business users, our system’s scalability can save
business and upgrade costs i.e. if a SOHO user upgrades his network band-
width, SMS will automatically scale network analysis services for the user.
Sherry et al. also support our claim that using cloud resources to deploy
middleboxes can reduce costs and improve scalability for enterprise security
infrastructure [100].
5.11 Fault Tolerance
Sect. 4.1 discusses the backup instances maintained by SMS for OPMs.
These instances replace OPMs if it goes down during traffic analysis. When
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there are more than one replicas running for an OPM, any of these replicas
is promoted to OPM. If OPM recovers later, it starts acting as a replica,
otherwise, a new replica is launched by SMS “middlebox manager”.
Figure 31 shows a master (i.e. OPM) and backup node. When master
goes down, the backup node replaces it to become master and perform traffic
analysis. Later when master recovers from failure, it synchronizes itself with
current master and starts acting as a backup node. If the master does not
recover, a new backup node is launched for current master.
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Figure 31: Fault tolerance in middlebox operations using backup
replica instances. When a master middlebox goes down during operations,
SMS elevates its backup replica to become master and handle traffic analysis
operations. If the master comes back up online later, it starts to serve as
backup replica to new master, otherwise SMS launches a new backup instance
for the new master.
During this evaluation, we expect that running redundant copies of
analysis services does not incur extra cost over the whole system. However,
this assumption may not hold valid in scenarios with individual services
running for hundreds of thousands of users. To address fault tolerance and
scalability in such scenarios, we need to incorporate state of the art solutions
to maintain state-aware replicas in the given system.
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5.12 Robustness
The proposed system design allows it to improve its efficiency for network
management and threat detection using the data collected by different
networks via Secureboxes. A number of analysis services coupled with user’s
preferences and device profiling allow the system to identify the devices in
the network and setup corresponding network configurations. However, the
system should be robust enough to scale back its configuration changes from
the system.
The system relies on number of analysis services for its operations and
there is always a probability of false positives in the analysis results. In
order to deal with false positives, a team of human experts can audit the
configuration changes proposed by the system and remove any policies which
result in deteriorating network performance. This external audit is also used
as a system feedback to help it improve itself over time.
The system relies on individual services for threat, malware, botnet etc.
detection. The techniques used for these purposes use machine learning
which can also lead to false positives in the system [104, 87, 56, 98]. Such
techniques have been constantly improving in the recent times to minimize
false positives and we expect such technique to further improve in future.
Although the system favors to minimize false positives using feedback
from system, human experts, end users etc. but false negatives are even
more important for providing better security. An attacker needs only one
weak link to infect the whole system therefore the techniques achieving lower
false negatives at the cost of false positives can be preferred because it is
okay to block a link as precaution instead of serving a malicious link which
would infect the user’s devices and network. Therefore, bloom filters based
malware and threat detection techniques can be particularly useful.
5.13 Infrastructure Security
The proposed system moves the security and network functionality to a
central entity and it is clear that a central entity is susceptible to different
kind of attacks e.g. DDoS etc. The system also collects information from
various networks segments and disseminate security policies based on this
information. Therefore, rogue users can craft special analysis request for
the system which trick system into generating policy updates directing all
Secureboxes to block all traffic to/from the network.
Figure 8 shows a number of components in SMS architecture to deal
with any attacks against SMS. Central server receives all the requests from
Securebox, making it a primary target for DDoS attacks. In order to increase
its resilience to these attacks, SMS maintains a state-aware replica of central
server which would replace central server immediately if it goes down. The
service can also use a distributed central server making it more efficient and
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resilient to attacks. Virtual middlebox manager is responsible for inspecting
middlebox instance utilization and incoming traffic load. In case, a middlebox
is over utilized, new instances are launched to share the traffic analysis load.
The certification authority is responsible for maintaining Securebox and
user certificates. Every incoming request is verified by the certification au-
thority to make sure that requests from only legitimate sources are processed
by the system. The certification authority receives information about user
subscription and preferences from user, device management services to limit
the scope of traffic analysis request.
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Figure 32: Simulated DDoS attack by flooding traffic anlaysis re-
quests to SMS. (a) Latency experienced during the simulated attack on
SMS remains constant showing that end user does not experience significant
delay due to service outage during an attack. (b) Average CPU usage for
all instances shows that SMS scales well in case of increasing traffic analysis
load to maintain the latency experienced by the end user. (c) As the traffic
analysis load increases, SMS launches new instances to keep CPU usage
inbound and prevent service outage due to overloaded instances analyzing
incoming requests.
Anomaly detection engine shown in Fig. 8 inspects operational logs for
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the whole system to detect any anomalous behavior in traffic analysis request
or system components. These logs are also analyzed by human experts and
the information combined from automated and human analysis is combined
to block any misbehaving system components or Securebox.
In order to prevent spread of rumour-based policy updates by rogue
(acting like SMS) Secureboxes in the system, a Securebox only accepts policy
database updates certified by SMS. In order to prevent man-in-the-middle
attacks, all communication between Securebox and SMS is encrypted using
the state of the art used for web traffic encryption.
We have also tested our system performance against a simulated DDoS
attack which is launched by bombarding the system with a number of analysis
requests. Figure 32 shows the performance hit taken by the system in case
of a DDoS attack. We have monitored system latency and CPU usage to
evaluate the ability of system to tolerate such attacks. Figure 32a shows
that the system is able to maintain only a slight increase in latency during
the simulated DDoS attack. It shows the proposed system has ability to
maintain latency in bounds, during a reasonably sized attacks.
Figure 32b shows the internal statistics about traffic analysis instances. It
shows that the CPU overhead increased linearly with the number of incoming
requests. Figure 32c shows that SMS also increased the number of new
instances as the computational load increases. It would prevent overloading
of instances analyzing incoming requests. Therefore, the system was able to
divide the incoming traffic load across all these instances to bound the CPU
usage load and latency experienced by the user.
5.14 Discussion
The results presented here are obtained using the data collected from the
prototype system in university laboratory setup. During the experimentation,
we tried to simulate the behavior of an average house hold user to get better
estimate of system performance in terms of user experiences. However, these
results can vary in real world deployment setups depending on the mode of
deployment. For example, the communication latency between Securebox
and SMS is very low ≈ 1.56(±0.1)ms compared to real world setups where
SMS is deployed by a remote service. During evaluation, we have tried to
model the number of simultaneous traffic flows in the networks equivalent to
what we expect in a common house hold with 10-15 devices. The performance
of system can be affected by the increase in number of simultaneous traffic
flows in the network. The layout of network was also static compared to
public Wi-Fi or enterprise networks where devices join/leave frequently. We
have not evaluated the performance hit for the system in such scenarios.
Similarly, the system was also not evaluated for the out-of-band devices
communications where IoT devices can directly influence other devices to
perform an action e.g. “upon sensing an increase in room temperature by
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temperature sensor, alarm rings and sounds of alarm results in activation of
fire safety system”. Currently, we have a performed limited evaluation on
securing D2D interactions within user network. We expect that this area will
be explored to evaluate system performance in securing D2D interactions
with single level or multilevel cross-device dependencies.
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6 Features and Use Cases
The proposed system design is motivated by the need to developed a unified
platform which can be deployed across a number of different scenario ranging
from SOHO to enterprise network. The flexibility in deployment of proposed
system allows the system to get a comprehensive view of disjoint network
segments and use this global view to improve security situation in all those
individual network segments. In this chapter, we discuss various features and
use cases of our proposed platform including SOHO and enterprise scenarios.
We highlight the advantages and limitations of using the proposed system in
each of these scenarios.
6.1 Device Discovery and Profiling
The proposed system uses device discovery and identification mechanism for
improving network security and management. With growing popularity of
IoT and smart devices, typical networks are expected to connect a number of
devices. These devices can be specialized to perform different activities and
average users may not be able to characterize these devices based on their
network activity. Sect. 1 explains how these devices can be can be vulnerable
and raise different security issues.
In order to deal with the security issues, the proposed system uses a
dynamic access control mechanism. Securebox acts as sensor and enforcer
of this dynamic control mechanism and SMS acts as the control plane
deciding what access control should be applied. In order to minimize the
solution’s reliance on human efforts, our system automates the task of device
identification and security profiling. However, the automated services are
always take suggestive or preventive measures only and their actions can be
overridden by user’s choice.
Device discovery mechanism allows the system to identify any devices
connected to the Securebox. Once the device is identified, Securebox can
obtain device specific policies from SMS and enforce them in the network.
Device discovery mechanism is particularly useful to secure networks where
unknown devices are frequently connected to the network. Using this mecha-
nism, Securebox can actively prevent any attacks due to vulnerable device
connected to the network.
SMS maintains a database of all identified devices and related security
threats. This database is maintained by combing information from third
parties, vulnerability databases and human experts. This database also
contains devices related activity fingerprints, user registrations and data
from device manufacturers, which is used to identify the devices when they
are connected to the network. This information is also updated periodically
using new device registrations and other data.
Securebox can use a variety of methods for device identification. The
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proposed system requires users to register their personal devices with SMS
for using device and context specific services at different Securebox. Device
registration requires a user to give some information about the device and
user preferences. This information is stored along with user profile and later
used to identify the device when it is connected at different Secureboxes.
For the devices which are not registered to the Securebox e.g. in an
enterprise guest networks, where unknown device connected to the network.
Securebox can use device activity to recognize the devices. For this purpose,
SMS needs to maintain a database of device activity signatures. These
signatures can also be obtained from user’s registered devices and user
anonymity can be ensured by removing any user related information from
these signatures. When a device connects to the network, Securebox analyzes
its network activity to obtain a signature for device activity, which is used
by SMS to identify the device and enforce required policies to the network.
SMS also allows users to setup device profiles which is a quick and
handy way to set up device preferences. Each of these profiles include a set of
preferences e.g. “parental control” profile will include all preference which are
required for parental control setup. Users can dynamically set these profiles
on any of the devices. As soon as the device profile is updated, SMS will
generate a policy database update for Securebox where the device is currently
connected so that device activity is limited by the profiles preferences.
Device profile reduces the effort to individually setup and update policies
for each of the user registered devices. This is very useful in enterprise
scenarios, where the number of device is huge and network management team
can easily update or limit the access to set of devices by updating device
profile preferences.
6.2 AP Management
The proposed system design support automated access point management
services. The system provides allows user to specify security and management
preferences for their registered Secureboxes. The system also allows the user
to setup securebox profiles, context specific policies for different secureboxes
and SMS ensures that these preferences are implemented at all Secureboxes.
When users deploys a new Securebox in their network, they register it in
their user profile and setup its preferences (if any). SMS uses these preferences
to setup initial policies on the Securebox and all subsequent operations are
performed based on these preferences e.g. if the network manager sets up a
policy that “all traffic from Secureboxes deployed in meeting room should be
analyzed by Firewall and DPI”, SMS will setup the policy database update
for Securebox such that its traffic should be redirected via the specified
middleboxes. Similarly, if a user specifies that any Securebox at their home
should serve active parental control for all devices registered as kid’s devices,
SMS will use device information and generate a policy update which makes
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sure that all traffic from specific (kid’s) devices should adhere to parental
control guidelines.
This feature allows the system to setup context specific preferences
(policies) at Securebox. SMS also updates the management policies at all
Secureboxes based on the analysis services. SMS also monitors the traffic
analysis requests and other activity from a Securebox and actively blocks
any misbehaving Secureboxes to prevent any attacks against SMS itself.
6.3 Device Level Data Cap
With increasing utilization of video content over the Internet and fixed data
plans, it becomes frequent for data users to over utilize their monthly bills
resulting in overcharging for extra data used. Our system also supports data
cap management for individual devices. It allows users to setup data caps
for each of their devices to make sure that their monthly data plan usage
does not cross the limits. Securebox collects the data used by the device and
sends it to SMS where data usage record is maintained on per devices basis.
User gets notifications about the device data usage once it crosses pre
defined limits and takes any measures based on user preferences e.g. “Block a
device if it exceeds its quota for data usage”. The system allows to implement
different QoS for devices depending on their data usage e.g. “if the device
uses 70% of its quota, it’s bandwidth should be slashed by 30%”. Since
the information is stored in SMS, similar QoS can be experienced at all
Secureboxes connected to same SMS.
The information about per device data usage is also useful for the user
to understand device utilization pattern. Research has shown that users
appreciate to get information about data usage of their individual devices
and it helps them handle their data plans better [18]. Some users are also
able to find anomalies in device and application functionality due to unusual
data usage patterns e.g. “Based on the data usage, a user can identify if its
TV is streaming any content to some external server at night times (when
TV is not being used)”. Similarly, this feature helps users to identify any
malicious applications on mobile devices or malicious IoT devices by looking
at their data usages.
6.4 Dynamic Traffic Analysis
The proposed system allows the user to request traffic analysis by combining
different services in desired sequence. SMS can itself process the traffic
through a series of middleboxes if required. This feature is similar to service
chaining concept where for bundling different application services together
to develop a dedicated chain of services for processing tasks.
These middlebox and traffic analysis services are chained together accord-
ing to context based preferences from the user. It can be used to manage
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the traffic from two different devices coming through the same Securebox
(AP) e.g. traffic from enterprise’s own registered devices connected to confer-
ence room Securebox will be processed by middleboxes processing enterprise
middleboxes but traffic from a guest device connected to same conference
room Securebox should be passed through firewall first and then processed
through a separate set of middleboxes.
(a) Two different classes of traffic are pro-
cessing in separate analysis engines with
specific traffic analysis chain.
(b) All traffic from Securebox is re-routed
via SMS based middlebox deployment.
The string of middleboxes for traffic pro-
cessing can be dynamically updated de-
pending on traffic context and user prefer-
ences.
Figure 33: Subscriber control over traffic analysis operations. A user
can dynamically choose (modify) the services being used for traffic analysis
and steer traffic through one or more (different) middleboxes.
Figure 33a shows the case where user has configured that all traffic from
IoT devices (including smart TV, smart fridge, etc.) should be classified
as class A and rest of traffic as class B. Based on user preferences, class A
traffic should be handled by analysis engine 1 consisting of Firewall and IDS
service. Whereas, traffic from class B (i.e. traffic from user smartphone, PC,
tablet) should be handled by analysis engine 2 which processes this traffic
through a Firewall, IDS and DPI service.
The user can also set the context based traffic processing for situations
such that traffic should only be processed in DPI if suspicious behavior is
detected for any device. Dynamic service chaining allows user to save costs
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Internet
Figure 34: Securebox deployment in SOHO networks. Each home
can have one or most Secureboxes installed with each Securebox using SMS
services subscribed from some third party service provider.
of traffic analysis. It also provides more control over how the subscribed
services are used to control traffic processing and analysis.
Figure 33a shows the scenario where user traffic is tunnelled through a
set of middleboxes before going to the Internet. It is common place scenario
for network deployments where in-line middleboxes process all incoming
and outgoing traffic at gateway points. Using service chaining, users can
manually or automatically change the sequence of middleboxes used in this
chain for traffic processing.
This is particularly useful for enterprise scenarios where automated
setup can update the string of middleboxes processing the traffic. Similar
concepts have been previously introduced, allowing the user to redirect their
traffic through remotely deployed middleboxes but those ideas require user
involvement to identify malicious activity and configure their network to re
route their traffic. Our system provides automation to this task to make the
re-routing and dynamic middleboxes deployment easier and faster.
6.5 Small and Home Office Networks
SOHO networks are very crucial in overall network security scenario as
discussed in Sect. 1. Securing these vulnerable networks with millions of
connected devices was one of the primary motivations to build Securebox
platform. The deployment is fairly easy as the user needs to install a
Securebox as a gateway to the network or as an AP. These Secureboxes are
either obtained from a service provider as part of subscription bundle or
purchased as a separate device to be used with any third party SMS.
If Securebox is obtained as part of subscription bundle for SMS, it is
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already configured and user only needs to install it in their network and
Securebox should be able to communicate with SMS. User can then use
the mobile or web application to set up their security, management and
device preferences. Securebox will receive policy database update as part of
bootstrap operations and request SMS for any kind of anlaysis operations
required. The data collected from user network is also sent to SMS based on
user subscription and preferences.
This setup provides automated network management for the user. Using
SMS device identification services, Securebox can detect what devices are
connected to the network and implement any network policies specific to
those devices. SMS also maintains a database for device related threats and
security issues. When a device is detected in user network, SMS generates
email or mobile app notifications for the user about the device related threats
and any suggestions to mitigate these threats. This information enables users
to protect their data and privacy.
Using virtual middleboxes to analyze traffic and automated configuration
update, the system provides enterprise grade security for SOHO networks
at a fraction of that cost. These traffic analysis service also prevent users
to connect to any malicious servers which host malicious content resulting
in compromising user’s device to become part of a botnet, spam net. Ran-
somware have caused losses of millions of dollar for home users and it is very
crucial to protect home users from these ransom-ware and trojans [8]. By
actively checking all sources and destination of user traffic, Securebox greatly
limits phishing and ransom-ware attacks as it prevents user from connecting
to any illegitimate servers.
Studies have shown that typical users care about the protection of their
devices and privacy of their data [references]. However, typical networking
gear provide little or no feedback to users about the safety situation of
their network. Anti-virus applications also provide low level information
about the threats detected and blocked. Our system intends to raise user
awareness about their security and privacy by providing them high level
threat information in human understandable language e.g. “Webcam in
smart TV can be hijacked to stream your video to remote destination”.
This kind of feedback in form of mobile notifications keep users updated
about any threats in the network. A notification alerting user e.g. “Down-
loading any content from this site may infect your device” when it tries to
contact an untrustable site hosting some content will help user understand
the risks of downloading content from third party website. If an application
tricks user to download some content from a source other than legitimate
publisher, the system prevents such redirections and notifies the user about
misbehaving application so that user stop using it. This information is also
used to alert other users of the service to stop using misbehaving (potentially
malicious) application.
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6.6 Enterprise Networks
The proposed system decouples the enforcement plane from control plane
to increase its deployment flexibility to enterprise and large organizational
networks with multiple offices. Traditionally, large organizations and enter-
prises with multiple sub offices deploy middleboxes at each sub office and
the traffic is directed to organization’s central network before going out on
Internet. This setup requires huge deployment costs as it requires middlebox
deployments at remote sites and sub-offices.
Additionally, network management team has to maintain both these
remote middleboxes and central network which serves as gateway for or-
ganization’s Intranet to the Internet. In case of any issues with network,
management team has to individually update each of these Secureboxes at
all sites, which can become a tedious and time consuming. Research has
shown that manual configuration updates by human experts can often lead
to security loopholes [34]. Any one of these loopholes can grant attackers
access to organization’s internal network, which can cause serious damage to
organization/enterprise.
Our proposed system tries to cut down costs for enterprise network
deployment by replacing middleboxes with lightweight Secureboxes, see
Fig. 8. Figure 35 shows that each department, subdivision is connected to
enterprise network via Securebox. All these secureboxes are controlled by
SMS which is either deployed by enterprise itself or it is subscribed from
a third party service provider. In-house deployment will give more control
to enterprise over how the Secureboxes are configured, what information is
collected and how network is operated?
These Secureboxes provide more detailed view and discrete control over
the network as they can identify end devices connected to the network. It also
provides central control over all vantage points in the network. The automated
configuration updates from central management platform will minimize
inconsistencies and delay in configuration updates across the network. Using
in house SMS deployment for Securebox management, the networking team
can easily deploy and test new traffic analysis services in the enterprise
without the need to update/upgrade any of the Secureboxes.
Our proposed system requires less human personal to operate the system
by automating most of routine management and configuration tasks. It also
assists security experts by automating log analysis and anomaly detection
mechanism. It also improves the scalability of middlebox deployments and
prevent them from becoming bottlenecks in flash crowd scenarios. These
improvement have been discussed in detail in Sect. 5.
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Figure 35: Securebox deployment in enterprise networks. Enterprise
network management team can use external SMS for managing these secure-
boxes (provided by hardware vendor or third party service provider). The
can also deploy SMS locally to have more control over network services and
network data collection.
6.7 SecureWi-Fi Environments: Password free Wireless Net-
works with Trust Levels
With growing popularity of smart, mobile and IoT devices, wireless has
emerged as the primary mode of connectivity for such devices. In order to
connect to a user’s network, these devices typically need to authenticate to
the network’s Wi-Fi access point. These wireless APs typically use WPA-PSK
based authentication, which requires the devices to be authenticated using
pre-shared keys (PSKs), as shown in Fig. 36. WPA-PSK based authentication
is widely popular choice for setting up Wi-Fi networks because it does not
assume any security associations between users and device manufacturers
and is relatively to setup.
6.7.1 Limitations of WPA
The primary draw back of this technique is that authentication reliability
is dependent on the confidentiality of PSK, as any entity with access to PSK
will be able to authenticate itself with AP. Currently, the number of devices
associate to Wi-Fi networks is relatively small for typical SOHO networks.
With the emergence of IoT devices, the number of connected devices will
grow by an order of magnitude. These devices are developed by fast moving
teams in large enterprises or independent start-up teams who have limited
resources and hard deadlines to launch their devices.
Therefore, security get little to no consideration in product design and
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Figure 36: Typical WPA-PSK based wireless network setup. In these
setups, each device is authenticated using same PSK.
development process. Mostly, these devices do not have a device life cycle
support, which leads to likelihood of having many IoT devices with a number
of security vulnerability and no support cycle to provide security updates or
software patches [72]. Attackers and hackers can exploit these vulnerabilities
obtain the PSK, this compromising the security of device authentication [81,
116, 119].
Using one PSKs for setting up Wi-Fi networks has many other issues
undermining the reliability of using PSK as network security parameters e.g. if
an employee leaves the enterprise, the PSK needs to be updated, which means
re-associating all devices with new PSK. It can be a tedious task to perform in
large networks and become more troublesome if happens frequently. Similarly,
the PSKs typically used to setup SOHO networks are not very strong and
can easily be broken by an attacker [109]. Since Wi-Fi connectivity is not
bounded by physical parameters, attacker can get authenticated connectivity
to the targeted network without need to break into target premises. Once
attacker devices authenticate to target network using compromised PSK, it
can snoop on other device activity, infect other devices and perform a number
of other attacks [22].
The compromise of PSK confidentiality can have adversely affect the
security of targeted network, as an attacker is able to join the network and
attack other devices in the network. Therefore, we require a Wi-Fi deployment
framework which resolves the security issues raised by compromised PSKs.
IEEE 802.1X system allows Wi-Fi networks to setup a RADIUS server for
managing client and device authentication. Such a setup uses user credentials
to allow connectivity for a device once it joins the network. However, this
technique requires setting up authentication and authorization servers in the
network and may not work with typical APs deployed in SOHO environments.
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6.7.2 State of the Art
Another technique to mitigate this problem is to user device specific PSKs
to connect different devices to the network. Ruckus networks have proposed
a patented scheme to use device specific Dynamic PSK (DPSK) [97]. This
setup generates dynamic keys for each connected device and updates them
automatically on user devices. However, this technique only works with
proprietary hardware from Ruckus networks. Also, it requires to setup
a authentication service and an application on smart-phone or laptops to
operate. Therefore, its usability in greatly limited in IoT case and typical
SOHO networks.
Aerohive networks have also proposed a similar scheme of using private
PSKs (PPSK) [73]. This scheme allows the network manager to generate a set
of PSKs which are used for associating devices (one device per key). This
technique also works only with proprietary Aerohive APs and Hive Manager.
Both these technique provide support to revoke key if the key or device
is compromised, but they do not provide support to setup dynamic access
control based on device behavior. Therefore, an attacker can still successfully
impersonate any device and use the compromised key to authenticate with
the network and infect other devices.
6.7.3 Proposed Solution
Using our proposed system, we provide a solution for network deployments
which can resolve security issues raised by compromised PSKs (including
DPSK, PPSK). Our system utilizes PSKs and other techniques for device
identification and dynamic access control to limit device connectivity in the
network. In most cases, IoT devices have only a specific functionality which
requires only limited network interactions for operations e.g. a smart kettle
requires to connect to smartphone for getting coffee making instructions but
it does not need to connect to any other device in the network e.g. smart
fridge or smart TV.
Similarly, a smart doorbell only needs to be able to connect to smartphone
application but does not need any connectivity with smart kettle or any
other device inside home. Using this information, our system can limit the
device interactions with other devices in the network.
In order to identify the device, we can use a number of parameters
including device registration, device activity fingerprinting and device specific
unique PSKs. Device registrations are performed by users when they first
connect a device to the network. Based on user preferences, no unregistered
device should have access to any device in the network (or not network access
at all). When the device is registered, a unique PSK (uPSK) is generated for
the device to connect to the network, see Fig. 37. Different techniques to
identify a device and its profile are discussed in detail in Sect. 6.1. Device
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Securebox
PSK: UjtP3JDGYD
PSK: fpQADGjfD5
PSK: K9h8T34t6d
PSK: 5tJrmdd2pZ
PSK: 2dqLR4Xyrp
PSK: f46sbGZKbd
Figure 37: Securebox based network deployment using uPSK. uPSK
based scheme uses unique keys for each of the device. These keys are used to
identify the device and limit device access to the network as well.
specific uPSK will also become on of the parameters to identify the device.
When Securebox identifies a device, it requests SMS to send policy
database update including device specific security policies in the network.
These policies limit the device interactions to any other devices and limits
its access to the Internet e.g. if user sets up a CCTV camera at his home,
SMS will send policy database which would direct Securebox to “not allow
any IoT device to connect to CCTV camera from user network” and “donot
allow any connections to CCTV camera to/from Internet”. User can specify
the file server to record video feed from CCTV camera and that policy will
have higher priority then SMS’s injected policies. Therefore, CCTV will be
able to connect to user file server but not able to connect to any other server
on the Internet.
Dynamic access control greatly limits the attackers ability to infect other
devices in the network, even if it gets access to uPSK. Firstly, the attacker
will not be able to authenticate to the network because Securebox can detect
duplicate authenticate connection request using same uPSK and consider
it as anomaly. Securebox will raise an alarm and notify the user about
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Table 8 Feature comparison of device specific key based solution.
Features DPSK
[97]
PPSK
[73]
uPSK
Device specific keys X X X
Proprietary technique X X 5
Require proprietary hardware X X 5
Secure D2D communication 5 5 X
Auto update of keys Limited 5 Limited
Device profiling 5 5 X
Device vulnerability assessment 5 5 X
Support keyless wireless environ-
ments
5 5 X
Supports software-defined Wi-Fi 5 5 X
possible key compromise and replace compromised uPSK. The new uPSK is
automatically updated on destination device if the device supports running
software application e.g. smartphone, laptops or desktops. Otherwise, user
can update this key manually on IoT devices.
Secondly, if the attacker takes down the device from the network and use
compromised uPSK for that device to authenticate to the network, Securebox
will be able to distinguish attacker’s device from the device whose uPSK is
compromised. Once again, Securebox will detect the anomaly and uPSK will
be updated.
Thirdly, if the attacker is able to impersonate the device well enough
to trick device identification mechanism, the access granted to attacker’s
device will be greatly limited due to dynamic access control. This limited
connectivity will prevent attacker from infecting other devices in the network.
If the attacker tries to perform aggressive network attack, Securebox will
detect this activity, block the device from network and notify the user.
Table 8 provides a comparison of features offered by Aerohive PSK and
Ruckus DPSK based technique with our proposed uPSK technique. It shows
that our proposed technique provides a number of additional features to
secure D2D communications within user networks. These features are helpful
in cases where an infected device or an attacker tries to connect to user
network and infect other devices in the network.
In some cases, Wi-Fi networks can be setup without requiring any PSK.
Such networks will provide open connectivity to any device without requiring
prior authentication. Once the device is connected to the network, Securebox
runs a security estimation for the device. Combining security estimation
along with device registration information, Securebox will generate a trust
index for the device. The trust index will be used to setup device specific
policies in the network. These policies will dictate the network access level
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for the device. The proposed system can support this mechanism as it allows
Securebox to implement device and context specific policies on Securebox.
6.8 SWEN: Software-defined Wearable Networking
Wearables are becoming increasingly popular in recent times. These low-
power devices can be used for activity tracking, fitness tracking, health
monitoring [132, 15, 43, 76]. Recent research has shown promises to bring
connected clothes and accessories for users [103]. These wearable collect user
information and relay this information to user’s smartphone or tablet via
BLE. A companion application in user’s smartphone relays this information to
cloud-based services which provides various kind of suggestions and feedback
to the user.
The information collected by these middleboxes is sensitive because it
can be related to user health or his activity. Since, these devices can be
paired with mobile applications, an attacker can trick user’s wearable to leak
monitoring data [117, 69]. Therefore, we propose a new approach “Software-
defined Wearable Networks” (SWEN) for securing communications to/from
these wearables.
6.8.1 Design
SWEN leverages service based design from our proposed system for securing
user networks. It uses a software application to setup an adhoc network
using BLE, Wi-Fi, etc. for wearable devices to communicate securely. SWEN
uses contextual information to improve the security of the system. Figure 38
shows the high level design of SWEN where “SWENBox” resides on user’s
smartphone or a lightweight (similar to wearable) component. It provides the
user interface to manage device and security preferences. It uses application
logic and contextual information to support secure interactions between
devices. The contextual information can be collected from various sensors
available at the smartphone or wearable device.
The system also uses an external security which provides security services
for wearable. This security services is responsible for management of device
profiles, users information and trusted D2D interactions. It also provides
control to users to setup custom preferences over how their wearable should
be managed and secured. The remote service allows us to provide different
kind of security services for these wearables.
6.8.2 Goals
The goals of designing SWEN is to establish trust between these wearable
devices using collaborative sensing. This “big trust from little things” is
useful for sensing applications. The system is designed to support secure
pairing between devices and handling devices association in order to prevent
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Figure 38: Architecture of SWEN. SWEN can be deployed as smartphone
application or using a wearable whereas the remote service can be deployed
by an external service provider.
an attacker with communicating with user wearables. The system achieves
this by monitoring all communications among wearables and other devices
within adhoc network. This adhoc networks provides a medium for seamless
and secure D2D communication among devices that are authenticated by
the remote security services.
SWEN design also prevents relay and MITM attacks by allowing devices
to communicate within trusted networks. Since the wearables will only
communicate with/via SWENbox using hardware specific certificates, an
attacker can not pretend to be SWENbox for any wearable device. Therefore,
SWEN is able to achieve the goal of protecting user data privacy and secure
sensing with wearables.
6.8.3 Features
SWEN offers a number of features in order to achieve these goals. It uses
software-defined networking logic with isolation and second factor authentica-
tion (for devices) support by using contextual information of communicating
devices. The trust between communicating devices can be achieved by using
remote analytics service which supports context based trust assessment of
wearable and other devices. SWEN also supports “contextual fencing” to
provide context based access and services for any devices. Contextual fenc-
ing combines user preferences, security and trust assessment, and context
information of the device to manage access for device communication and
other services.
SWEN is useful to secure the interactions between trusted and untrusted
(unknown) IoT devices by offering selective isolation for D2D communications.
This kind of isolation is akin to the selective isolation provided by Securebox
for D2D communications within one network.
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6.8.4 Deployment
SWEN is designed as a software module which can leverage on the sen-
sor information of host device and work with a remote service to provide
various services. It is hardware independent and can be deployed as a smart-
phone application or a wearable device with reasonable power resources
e.g. Omega2 [23]. As a smartphone application, SWEN will be able to use
information from different sensors and applications (for wearable) to better
administrate user devices. It will also be easy to deploy as nearly every
wearable user carries a smartphone. On the other hand, deploying it on
independent hardware will give it more control over functionality (unbounded
by underlying OS) and provide enhanced features. The external security
service can be deployed by the user using his personal machine or it can be
provided by an external security service provider. Individual deployments
will offer more control over service functionality and modules. On the other
hand, third party deployments will increase the efficiency of service offering
better analytics, trust services.
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7 Discussion
We have explained design and architecture of Securebox and SMS in Sect. 3
and Sect. 4 respectively. The thorough evaluation of the system, give in
Sect. 5, shows that the design level choices for the proposed system had a
significant impact on system performance and efficiency.
System evaluation shows that service based model for providing security
as a service alternative to deploying in-line middleboxes in the network is a
practical solution. It offers many folds advantage including cost efficiency,
deployment efficiency, scalability etc. This model provides enterprise grade
security to SOHO users. It is very important to secure these users as they
form a significant percentage of victims of cyber crimes [63]. We have
developed this system as a software based services so that it can be easily
modified to deploy in different kinds of environments.
The proposed system can be deployed as a smartphone or PC application,
acting as a software firewall. This application will inspect all the traffic
to/from the device to secure the device connectivity. The dynamic design
of SMS allows the service to support different client applications, may it
be a hardware-based securebox or software application, as it is designed to
provide intelligence to the software/hardware enforcers.
The choice of using policy database updates has various advantages. It
significantly reduces the latency overhead and improves users experience
with the proposed system. It also allows to minimize the overhead on
SMS for (re)processing similar traffic request. The ability of system to
support software based virtual middleboxes is very useful for all users as
it alleviates the need of deploying, maintaining and constantly updating
those middleboxes. The system also supports a number of user and device
level services. These services allow the system and user to control D2D
communications which is very handy feature for security in Wi-Fi or IoT
environments. All these advantages and their impact on user experience are
discussed in detail in previous sections.
7.1 Limitations and Future Work
Besides all these advantages of proposed system, there are some limitations as
well. The key limitations of the system (for user’s experience) are increased
latency and user privacy.
7.1.1 Latency
Sect. 5.1 shows that the primary source of increase in this latency is the time
taken to analyze user’s traffic in software based middleboxes. Therefore, the
latency experienced by the user is directly affected by his choice for traffic
analysis. However, software based middleboxes can be improved to further
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decrease latency. Sect. 2 presents various promising solutions for virtual
middleboxes, which can be further improved to increase their efficiency to
become comparable with traditional hardware based middleboxes. Our work
leverages software middlebox work from existing research and focuses on
system design to decrease overall latency by minimizing the interactions
between Securebox and SMS.
The latency offered by our system can be further improved by improving
the communication model between Securebox and SMS. We use a central
database in SMS to combine all analysis results, which are then relayed to
Secureboxes via policy database updates or used to respond to user queries
instead of (re)analyzing similar traffic. The design of this database can be
further improve to decrease lookup times. The design of software based
middleboxes can be improved to make them more efficient for large scale
collaborative traffic analysis operations.
7.1.2 User Privacy
Since the system does remote analysis of user traffic, privacy advocates claim
this to be a breach in privacy as the user’s internet activity can be monitored
by the external service providing security and management of the network.
The proposed system uses trust-based model to mitigate these concerns, just
like any other service e.g. Gmail 16 or anti virus services. All services collect
information about the user but they have explicit agreement with the sub-
scribers to use this information. We propose the same model for deployment,
where user explicitly agrees on terms of data collection and corresponding
services. The proposed system also offers dedicated middleboxes, which
allow users to analyze their traffic in isolated environments, without sharing
information with the system. In order to further improve privacy preserving
analysis techniques can be designed. These techniques will allow the system
to share user traffic information with traffic analysis services without leaking
any information about the user himself.
7.1.3 Fault Tolerance
Figure 31 shows that our proposed system can provide fault tolerance using
backup replicas. However, maintaining these state aware replicas can be an
interesting problems. There are two different ways to address this problem.
One solution is to analyze the traffic simultaneously in both master and
backup instances. This approach will increase the system load for processing
the traffic but also increase the ability of system to detect inconsistent
middleboxes. Another solution is to share state information from master
to replicas but the efficiency of this approach is limited by the frequency
of information shared between the master and replicas. Currently, we use
16https://www.gmail.com
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use Kubernetes fault tolerance and scalability mechanism to assist fault
tolerance in proposed system but this problem can be further investigated to
improve system fault tolerance in real world deployments.
7.1.4 Device Identification and Profiling
The proposed system uses device identification and profiling mechanism to
automatically detect any devices connected to the network. Once these
devices are connected, Securebox can automatically install relevant security
policies in the network, depending on the type of vulnerabilities for the
devices. This mechanism needs two different kinds of services i.e. “device
discovery assistance service” (DDAS) and “device vulnerability database”
(DVD).
There can be different techniques used to discover new devices. The
device registration information can be used to detect the devices which are
registered by users with SMS. However, in order to detect (new) devices, their
network activity fingerprinting, hardware information can be used. DDAS
supports these device discovery techniques by providing support services and
related information for automatic classification of devices.
DVD on the other hand stores vulnerability information about the devices.
It collects this information from various resources e.g. CVE publishing systems,
security researchers, testbeds. This information is then used to profile these
vulnerabilities and design security policies to mitigate any threats to user
privacy and security due to these vulnerabilities.
Both DDAS and DVD require robust mechanisms for their functionality
and raise many interesting questions about how to improve the design and
efficiency of these services? how to profile IoT vulnerabilities? how to
automatically create security policies for a vulnerability? All these research
questions can be explored in the future work and their solution can be
valuable contributions for IoT and network security. The proposed system
can also use external services and data sources to improve systems ability to
prevent any attacks to user privacy or network due to device vulnerability.
Our current prototype is a proof of concept model showing that the system
works in the real world environment. Based on our evaluation, the system
provides an improved, cost efficient and scalable way to improve network
security situation in SOHO and enterprise networks. This system provides a
long due alternative for traditional network deployment techniques.
However, it needs to be improved in order to deal with challenges of
real world scale deployments. In this section, we have discussed some of
the limitations of current prototype and proposed directions for some of the
future work. The proposed system is the first attempt to realize network
management and security as a service model and it is expected to offer
various interesting research problems when deployed at large scale.
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A Appendix
A.1 Libraries
List of libraries used in the development of proposed system.
Libraries used in SMS development
Library Version License
Flask 0.1.0 Flask License
Dominate 2.1.16 GNU v3 General Public License
ForgeryPy 0.1 ForgeryPy License
Visitor 0.1.2 PSF or ZPL
Argparse 1.2.1 Python Licence
Flask-HTTPauth 3.1.1 MIT License
Flask-Login 0.3.2 MIT License
Flask-Moment 0.5.1 MIT License
Mongoengine 0.10.6 MIT License
Flask-bootstrap 3.3.5.7 BSD Licence
Flask-Script 2.0.5 BSD License
Flask-WTF 0.12 BSD License
Jinja2 2.8 BSD Licence
MarkupSafe 0.23 BSD Licence
WTForms 2.1 BSD Licence
Werkzeug 0.11.5 BSD Licence
Enum34 1.1.2 BSD Licence
Flask-mongoengine 0.7.5 BSD Licence
Itsdangerous 0.24 BSD Licence
Netaddr 0.7.18 BSD Licence
Mock 3.3 BSD Licence
Python-dateutil 2.5.3 Simplified BSD
Coverage 4.0.3 Apache v2.0 License
Pymongo 3.2 Apache v2.0 License
Selenium 2.53.1 Apache v2.0 License
Requests 2.10.0 Apache v2.0 License
Kubernetes 1.3.3 Apache v2.0 License
Docker 1.12.0 Apache v2.0 License
Requests Mock 1.0.0 Apache v2.0 License
MongoDB 3.0.8 Apache v2.0 License
Libraries used in Securebox development
Library Version License
Floodlight SDN controller 1.0 or later Apache v2.0 License
Open vSwitch 2.1 or later Apache v2.0 Licence
Gson 2.6.2 Apache v2.0 License
Hostapd na BSD License
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